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5 
Issues and Conclusions 
Movement on the Silk Road 
China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative as an Incentive 
for Intergovernmental Cooperation and Reforms 
at Central Asia’s Borders 
The Beijing Silk Road Forum, hosted by the Chinese 
government in May 2017, once again drew inter-
national attention to China’s global Belt and Road 
Initiative. The country aims to use it to bolster both 
its international legitimacy and its geopolitical power. 
Europe’s view of the initiative is ambivalent. On one 
hand, it promises a certain added value, for example 
investment in European infrastructure, on the other 
hand, China and the European states were unable to 
resolve their disagreements at the Forum. China was 
not prepared to include principles demanded by the 
Europeans in the final communiqué, in particular 
guarantees of free trade and fair competition, trans-
parency and social and environmental sustainability. 
For this reason, European states, including Germany, 
France and the UK, refused to sign the final text. 
Central Asian governments, on the other hand, 
have a less ambivalent attitude to the Chinese Initia-
tive. The presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan took part in the Forum and signed the 
communiqué. This was because of the great impor-
tance China now has in Central Asia, but also their 
strong desire to profit from the New Silk Road. 
It will not be possible for the EU to become an offi-
cial partner in the Chinese initiative for the foresee-
able future because the interests and norms of China 
and the EU differ too widely at the global level. In 
many regions, including Central Asia, the Initiative is 
already playing an important role and will continue 
to do so in the longer term. Given the opaque nature 
of international alliances, European states should, 
therefore, try to identify common foreign policy inter-
ests with China on specific topics or regions. 
It has long been one of the interests and objectives 
of EU’s Central Asia policy to promote intergovern-
mental cooperation and efficient border management. 
However, only modest success has been achieved to 
date. China’s Silk Road Initiative is closely linked 
to borders and cross-border trade. China is strongly 
encouraging certain reforms from the Central Asian 
states but is also making them a number of offers. This 
raises the question of whether the Chinese Initiative, 
along with other factors, will increase the willingness 
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6 
to reform and cooperate on Central Asia’s borders. If 
this is the case, it might be beneficial for the European 
Union to apply its competence and expertise and 
strengthen its commitment in this area. 
A lack of cooperation and inefficient borders are 
an obstacle for the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), 
the Eurasian part of the Silk Road Initiative. One im-
portant element of the SREB is the plan to transport 
goods for export by high-speed train from China to 
Western Europe. In the long term, China would like 
to transport one percent of all goods to Europe by 
land. This Initiative allows the country to pursue its 
strategic, geopolitical goals and is one of Chinese 
President Xi Jinping’s pet foreign-policy projects. As a 
result, the government’s interest in it being a success 
is correspondingly high. In order for the rapid transit 
of goods to pay off in the long term, reforms and bet-
ter cooperation on Central Asia’s borders are essential. 
Opportunities for changes in cooperation patterns 
and reforms at the borders of Central Asian countries 
are now far greater than in the first two decades after 
independence. Firstly, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s 
growth models have reached their limits which means 
that both states are now under greater pressure to 
reform. Secondly, political rule in Central Asia is 
now more institutionalized, thus opening up scope 
for partial reforms. Thirdly, since the beginning of the 
century, China has emerged as a powerful actor in 
the region but, unlike Russia, it is interested in better 
intra-regional cooperation in Central Asia, even if this 
takes place only at the bilateral level. Fourthly, the 
SREB provides numerous incentives for reform and 
more cooperation at the borders. In its official strategy 
documents, Beijing propagates certain policies to fa-
cilitate rapid transit, such as efficient border manage-
ment and cooperative, neighbourly relations between 
states. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have officially 
committed to the Belt and Road Initiative and have 
received generous loans for infrastructure projects. 
Kazakhstan can also expect substantial investment. 
Although China has not imposed any conditions, it 
has created concrete incentives and mechanisms for 
the transfer of institutions. 
However, all this does not mean that reforms will 
now inevitably take place. Certainly, the Central Asian 
states involved can no longer pull out of the Initiative 
completely. Consequently, the resulting question is 
how comprehensive, tedious and protracted will the 
reforms be. This, in turn, depends on how strong 
the states’ interests are in them and what difficulties 
they will have implementing them. 
For Germany and the EU, it might be worth discus-
sing common interests with China and how synergies 
could be used to positively influence the reforms. China 
is already cooperating with expert organizations. How-
ever, the EU has the advantage of being able to access 
knowledge and experience from institutionalized part-
nerships in the region, namely its long-standing project 
on border reforms in Central Asia. The EU would, 
therefore, need to develop cooperation on a technical 
level. In the context of the EU’s commitment, Germa-
ny could, for example, suggest to the Central Asian 
states that it play a paramount role in border reform. 
Since these will be difficult in any case, the topic 
should not be dealt with solely at expert level. For this 
reason, the EU, together with the Central Asian states 
and China, should also organize political dialogue 
devoted to reforms at the governmental level. This 
could check anti-reformists within the states and give 
the reformers some momentum. 
One focus here should be on Uzbekistan. Although 
the country, under its new president, has signalled a 
great deal of willingness to reform, it will have to over-
come some very high hurdles. Not only are there fewer 
reform incentives than for Kazakhstan, but the path is 
also stonier. It can expect numerous setbacks. It is also 
important for regional stability that Uzbekistan does 
not fall further behind Kazakhstan economically and 
that regional inequality does not continue to increase. 
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Introduction 
 
The issues raised here are linked to three debates 
currently being discussed in European foreign policy. 
Firstly, the EU’s interests with regard to the Chinese 
Silk Road Initiative. Secondly, the content of EU’s 
Central Asia policy for the coming years is up for dis-
cussion. Thirdly, it will have to be clarified how the 
current changes in Central Asia are to be assessed, 
particularly the economic upheaval, the reform 
impetus and the influence of external actors. 
The most comprehensive and intensive of these 
three debates is the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, 
also known as the New Silk Road Initiative. Since its 
official announcement by Beijing, it has developed 
rapidly and is beginning to take shape. At the Silk 
Road Forum in May 2017, the Chinese government 
was able to draw international attention to its global 
project.1 The European debate is centred around geo-
political and trade-policy topics as well as on infra-
structure issues. Opinions are divided as to whether 
the Initiative benefits or harms European interests. 
Some see it as a threat to the EU due to the 16+1 for-
mat that China is pursuing with some Eastern Euro-
pean EU Member States or due to China’s growing 
global power.2 Others hope the Initiative will also 
benefit Europe.3 Today, for example, European logis-
 
1 Tom Hancock, “China Encircles the World with One Belt, 
One Road Strategy”, Financial Times, 3 May 2017; Hendrik 
Ankenbrand, “Der Welthandel soll über Chinas Seidenstraße 
rollen”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 May 2017, http:// 
www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/mammut 
projekt-der-welthandel-soll-ueber-chinas-seidenstrasse-rollen-
15012993.html (accessed 22 May 2017). 
2 Stephan Scheuer, “China will ‘neue Seidenstraße’ nach 
Osteuropa”, Handelsblatt, 24 November 2015, http://www. 
handelsblatt.com/politik/international/der-161-gipfel-china-
will-neue-seidenstrasse-nach-osteuropa/12626548.html 
(accessed 14 December 2016); “EU Investigates Chinese High-
speed Rail Project in Hungary and Serbia”, Gbtimes, 20 Feb-
ruary 2017, http://gbtimes.com/business/eu-investigates-
chinese-high-speed-rail-project-hungary-and-serbia (accessed 
20 February 2017). 
3 Alex Capri, “Here Are 5 Ways China’s New Silk Road Is 
Good for Western Companies”, Forbes, 9 February 2017, http:// 
www.forbes. com/sites/alexcapri/2017/02/09/here-are-a-5-ways-
chinas-new-silk-road-is-good-for-western-companies/ (accessed 
9 February 2017); Jacopo Maria Pepe, China’s Inroads into Cen-
tral, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe. Implications for Germany 
tics companies are among its beneficiaries.4 However, 
the present study will only make marginal mention 
of the geo-policy or trade-policy context. It will focus 
instead on the impact of the Silk Road Initiative on 
institutional reforms in Central Asia. 
The second debate concerns the EU’s Central Asia 
policy. The institutional framework for the EU’s com-
mitment to the region is its Central Asia strategy 
which was formulated in 2007 under Germany’s 
presidency and revised in 2015. On 19 June 2017, the 
Council of the European Union decided to develop a 
new Central Asia strategy by the end of 2019 which 
will be valid from 2021 onwards.5 The important 
question is to what extent should the EU focus more 
on policy areas and topics that are both in the inter-
ests of the regimes in Central Asia as well as in the 
interests and values of the Union. It will also discuss 
the extent to which the EU pursues interests similar 
to those of major external powers. 
Compared to other external actors, the EU has some 
advantages. It has more experience and expertise in 
technical cooperation with Central Asia than China. 
The EU was only able to achieve modest results with 
its long-term programme of border reforms in Central 
Asia (Border Management Programme in Central Asia, 
BOMCA). Nevertheless, the programme has allowed it 
to gain specific knowledge of the particular difficulties 
in these areas. Even though the EU has only limited in-
fluence, it could make its foreign policy commitment 
more effective by looking for possible common inter-
ests with major influential powers. Border reforms are 
not only in the interests of Central Asian states, but also 
of China. This is closely linked to the third debate which 
discusses how to regulate the recent changes seen in 
Central Asia and determine how deep they will go. 
The present study focuses on whether the Belt and 
Road Initiative makes reforms and cooperation more 
 
and the EU, DGAP Analyse no. 3 (Berlin: Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Auswärtige Politik [DGAP], 23 March 2017), https://dgap. 
org/de/article/getFullPDF/29291 (accessed 22 May 2017). 
4 Participating firms include DB Schenker and DHL. 
5 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the 
EU Strategy for Central Asia (Brussels, 19 June 2017), http://data. 
consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10387-2017-INIT/en/ 
pdf (accessed 17 July 2017). 
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8 
likely on the border between Kazakhstan and Uzbeki-
stan. It is, therefore, about changes to or transfer of 
institutions. These are understood here in a broad his-
torical-sociological sense, as “formal or informal pro-
cedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded 
in the organizational structure of the polity or politi-
cal economy”.6 Political institutions do not exist com-
pletely autonomously from society but are influenced 
by social symbol systems, patterns of perception and 
notions of morality.7 
Institutional reforms within a country can be traced 
back to both internal and external factors. Reforms are 
unlikely to happen without an internal ‘reform coali-
tion’ among political elites. This also applies to authori-
tarian systems which is due to an often overlooked 
paradox of authoritarianism: the more resources and 
decision-making power an authoritarian ruler pos-
sesses, the more dependent he is on his personnel. 
They provide him with information and control the 
implementation of decisions. In order to implement 
and realise reforms, he needs supporters in politics 
and bureaucracy who are interested in these reforms. 
However, in practice, this is often more difficult than 
generally assumed.8 
Even if domestic policy-makers are largely in favour 
of institutional reforms, they often also depend on 
external factors.9 New laws and regulations in an eco-
nomically strong country may lead to similar reforms 
in countries dependent on trade with this country. 
Larger states sometimes also deliberately try to influ-
ence legislation in smaller states by creating incentives 
or pressure. The prestige of a major power can also 
make smaller states copy the institutions and policies 
of this major power.10 
 
6 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, “Political Science 
and the Three New Institutionalisms”, Political Studies 44, no. 5 
(1996): 936–57 (938). 
7 Ibid., 947. 
8 In contrast, the widespread assumption in transformation 
research in the 1990s was that authoritarian rulers could, in 
principle, make and implement any decision. Carothers was 
the first person to cast doubt on this thesis. Thomas Carothers, 
“The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Journal of Democracy 13, 
no. 1 (2002): 5–21. 
9 This has been the focus of diffusion research. See e.g. Kurt 
Weyland, “Theories of Policy Diffusion: Lessons from Latin 
American Pension Reform”, World Politics 57, no. 2 (2005): 
262–95. 
10 Benjamin O. Fordham and Victor Asal, “Billiard Balls or 
Snowflakes? Major Power Prestige and the International Dif-
fusion of Institutions and Practices”, International Studies Quar-
terly 51, no. 1 (2007): 31–52. 
In analyzing the influence of the Chinese Belt and 
Road Initiative on Central Asian states, both types of 
factors play a role. Economic upheaval has, therefore, 
increased pressure on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to 
reform. This affects the internal political constellation 
of reformers and anti-reformists. In addition, there are 
two important external factors: firstly, the rise of China 
as a regional power in Central Asia which is clearly 
different from Russia and, secondly, the Belt and Road 
Initiative as a tool for stimulating reform and coopera-
tion. 
External actors in Central Asia: 
EU, Russia and the US 
China is now the most economically significant 
external player in Central Asia. Russia and to a lesser 
extent the EU, the US, Japan and Turkey also play a 
role. New actors such as South Korea and India are 
emerging and, in the future, perhaps also Iran as a 
regional player. 
Table 1 
Kazakhstan, trade in billions of euros, 2016 
Trading partner Russia China EU US 
Exports 3.17 3.81 16.7 0.56 
Imports 8.25 3.31  5.2 1.15 
Source: European Commission. 
Table 2 
Uzbekistan, trade in billions of euros, 2016 
Trading partner Russia China EU US 
Exports 0.63 1.37 0.17 0.09 
Imports 1.9 1.97 1.72 0.31 
Source: European Commission. 
The EU and its Member States are external actors 
with limited influence in the region. The EU main-
tains particularly close trading relations with Kazakh-
stan. The volume of Kazakh trade with Europe in 2014 
was €30.6 billion and €5 billion with Germany. Much 
of this is due to oil exports. The trading volume fell to 
€17.9 billion in 2016 as a result of the fall in oil prices.11 
 
11 European Commission, European Union, Trade in Goods with 
Kazakhstan, 3 May 2017, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/ 
2006/september/tradoc_113406.pdf (accessed 9 May 2017). 
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The EU signed an extended partnership agreement 
with Kazakhstan in 2015. EU trade with four other 
countries in Central Asia – Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan – is at a rather low level. 
The EU was one of the first external actors to take up 
the cause of promoting regional trade and facilitating 
transport. Some of the corridors now used by China for 
its Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Pro-
gram (CAREC) are based on the EU’s TRACECA pro-
gramme (Transport Corridor Europe–Caucasus–Asia).12 
The Central Asia strategy, which was drafted by 
Germany in 2007, has raised the EU’s relations with 
the region to a more formal level.13 The aim of the 
strategy was to give the relationship greater symbolic 
importance as well as to define specific priorities for 
EU commitment. It defined seven areas of cooperation: 
1) Human rights and the rule of law, good governance 
and democratization, 2) Youth and education, 3) Eco-
nomic development, 4) Energy and transport, 5) En-
vironmental protection, 6) Combating common threats, 
7) Intercultural dialogue. A number of different pro-
grammes are linked to the strategy, such as the Rule 
of Law Initiative, the Border Management Programme 
in Central Asia (BOMCA) and the Central Asia Drug 
Action Programme (CADAP).14 In 2015, the Central 
Asia strategy was reviewed and the project budget 
was increased by 56 percent to over €1 billion for the 
period 2017–2021.15 In addition to the political and 
economic cooperation taking place as part of the Cen-
tral Asia Strategy, Europe is also present in the region 
in the form of the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD). In 2015, it was involved in 
financing inter alia infrastructure projects worth €1.4 
billion.16 
 
12 Marlène Laruelle and Sébastien Peyrouse, Regional Organi-
sations in Central Asia: Patterns of Interaction, Dilemmas of Efficiency, 
Working Paper no. 10/2012 (Bishkek: University of Central 
Asia, Institute of Public Policy and Administration, 2012), 
http://www.ucentralasia.org/Content/Downloads/UCA-IPPA-
WP-10-RegionalOrganizations.pdf (accessed 10 August 2016). 
13 European Council, The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a 
New Partnership (Brussels, 31 July 2007), https://eeas.europa.eu/ 
sites/eeas/files/st_10113_2007_init_en.pdf (accessed 3 Novem-
ber 2017). 
14 Andrea Schmitz, “The Central Asia Strategy: An Exercise 
in EU Foreign Policy Making”, in The European Union and Cen-
tral Asia, ed. Alexander Warkotsch (London, 2014), 11–21. 
15 Council of the European Union, Relations with Central Asia. 
Council Conlcusions on the EU Strategy for Central Asia (Brussels, 
22 June 2015), http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ 
ST-10191-2015-INIT/en/pdf (accessed 3 November 2017). 
16 Svitlana Pyrkalo, “EBRD Investment in Central Asia Reaches 
Record €1.4 Billion in 2015”, European Bank for Reconstruc-
Box 1: TRACECA, CAREC, BOMCA 
China’s New Silk Road Initiative is neither the 
only nor the first initiative aimed at promoting 
trade and economic cooperation in Eurasia. 
TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe–Caucasus–
Asia) is a European Commission initiative founded 
in Baku in 1998. Its members are all the states in 
Central Asia and the South Caucasus except Turk-
menistan. Its aim is to promote trade within the 
region and with Europe through international 
transport corridors. TRACECA has had some suc-
cess in technical aspects but has made no progress 
at the institutional level. 
The Central Asia Regional Economic Coopera-
tion (CAREC) programme was launched in 1997 at 
the instigation of the Asian Development Bank. In 
addition to all five Central Asian countries, China, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Mongolia also partici-
pate in CAREC. It pursues objectives similar to those 
of TRACECA but focuses on connectivity with the 
Asian neighbours of Central Asia. The programme 
was successful in terms of establishing, developing 
and monitoring transport corridors in Central Asia. 
CAREC has not yet succeeded in breaking down 
trade barriers. 
The Border Management Programme in Central 
Asia (BOMCA) is an EU programme aimed at im-
proving border management in Central Asia. The 
focus of commitment is now on supporting the 
technical modernization of border installations 
and training personnel. In practice, more attention 
is given to border security than to facilitating trade. 
Russia, the former regional hegemon, is still strongly 
linked to the region economically, culturally and also 
in terms of security policy. Although the country lost 
its position as the most important trading partner and 
investor to China, it still plays a key role in Central 
Asia. Consequently, Russia is still Kazakhstan’s second 
most important trading partner. 
In security policy terms, Russia is relevant to the 
region in multiple – and ambivalent – ways. It acts as a 
security policy guarantor for the authoritarian regimes 
of the region and dominates the most important mili-
tary organization in the post-Soviet region, the Col-
 
tion and Development, 13 January 2016, http://www.ebrd. 
com/news/2016/ebrd-investment-in-central-asia-reaches-
record-14-billion-in-2015.html (accessed 15 December 2016). 
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lective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), but to 
which Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan do not belong. 
The annexation of the Crimea has also made it clear 
to the Central Asian regimes that refusing to show 
loyalty to the former hegemon would threaten their 
national security. However, unlike in the case of 
Ukraine, there is no integration competition for 
Russia in Central Asia, neither with the EU nor China. 
The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is Russia’s 
regional project which has been primarily promoted 
with Kazakhstan. It is the first regional organization 
in the post-Soviet area to pursue economic integration 
and to create a joint internal market and levy com-
mon external tariffs. However, due to the economic 
crisis in Russia, the EAEU has not been able to gain 
any momentum. Kazakhstan has already suffered 
considerable economic losses from its integration.17 
The US was a particularly important security and 
economic actor in the region in the 1990s, especially 
in the oil business. After 2001, the US saw Central Asia 
primarily in the context of efforts to stabilize Afgha-
nistan. It had two military bases in Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, but these were closed in 2005 and 2014 
respectively. Hillary Clinton was the first to float the 
idea of a Silk Road Initiative during her visit to India 
in 2011. The United States wanted to pursue several 
geopolitical goals here: reducing the dependency of 
Central Asia on Russia, weakening Iran and streng-
thening Turkey. However, Clinton’s idea was never 
translated into a policy strategy by Washington and 
served more as a metaphor for US involvement in 
Central Asia.18 The US’s most recent cooperative ini-
tiative is the so-called 5+1 format. Discussions at 
meetings of Central Asian Foreign Ministers with the 
then US Secretary of State John Kerry were also about 
trading issues. No specific Central Asia policy has yet 
been identified under the Trump administration. How-
ever, the relationship between the US and Russia is 
relevant for Central Asia. A possible rapprochement 
between the two major powers is considered critical 
there.19 
 
17 Vjacheslav Polovinko, “Sojuz obrechennych” [Union of the 
Heteronomous], Novaja Gazeta, 13 January 2016, http://www. 
novayagazeta.ru/articles/2016/01/13/67029-soyuz-obrechennyh 
(accessed 10 August 2016). 
18 Marlène Laruelle, “The US Silk Road. Geopolitical Imagi-
nary or the Repackaging of Strategic Interests?”, Eurasian Geo-
graphy and Economics 56, no. 4 (2015): 360–75. 
19 “Trevozhnye ozhidanija na postsovetskom prostranstve” 
[Uneasy expectations in post-Soviet area], Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 
The major external powers influenced regional co-
operation and state reforms in different ways. Russia’s 
primary interest was and is (post-) hegemonic control 
over the countries of Central Asia, but not intra-regional 
cooperation. By joining the Central Asian Union in 
2005, Russia has helped end this regional project. The 
US, on the other hand, is said to have a fundamental 
interest in regional cooperation but did not actually 
promote it. The EU is now committed to promoting 
cooperation and reforms, but its influence in the 
region has proved to be too limited to initiate funda-
mental changes in interest. China is, therefore, the 
first external actor which not only has major power 
and considerable resources but also has a fundamen-
tal interest in more intra-regional cooperation. 
 
 
 
20 January 2017, http://www.ng.ru/editorial/2017-01-20/2_ 
6908_red.html (accessed 10 March 2017). 
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The context: economic upheaval, 
institutionalization, the rise of China 
 
External reform incentives and internal willingness 
to implement reforms in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
must now be looked at in a new light. Firstly, pressure 
to reform has increased because both states are suf-
fering from a structural economic crisis that threatens 
the financing of state control. Uzbekistan’s internal 
crisis is also exacerbated by regional processes, first 
and foremost, the establishment of the Eurasian Eco-
nomic Union. Secondly, the Central Asian states’ ca-
pacity to act has increased. Unlike in the 1990s, they 
have succeeded in institutionalizing their domestic 
and foreign policy. Their ability to implement political 
projects and, therefore, also reforms is fundamentally 
greater today than in the years after their respective 
declarations of independence. Thirdly, the period since 
the beginning of the millennium has been marked 
by China’s rise in Central Asia. As far as power in the 
region is concerned, certainly China can now compete 
with Russia. 
25 years of difficult relations 
Relations between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan since 
they declared independence in 1991 are characterized, 
above all, by Uzbekistan’s isolation and refusal to con-
clude partnerships. Although the two countries have 
signed extensive agreements, these have never been 
implemented. The 1998 Agreement on Eternal Friend-
ship20 was somewhat of an integration project. The 
states assured mutual aid in the face of threats to 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
which also included military support. They also agreed 
to coordinate their policies on regional and global 
issues.21 
 
20 The agreement was also signed by Kyrgyzstan, but it is not 
a multilateral document. Parlament Respubliki Kazachstan, 
O ratifikacii Dogovora o vechnoj druzhbe mezhdu Respublikoj Kazach-
stan i Respublikoj Uzbekistan [Ratification of the Agreement on 
Eternal Friendship between the Republic of Kazakhstan and 
the Republic of Uzbekistan], 1999. 
21 Farkhod Tolipov, “Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: Competi-
tors, Strategic Partners or Eternal Friends?”, Central Asia-
Caucasus Analyst, 9 August 2013, http://www.cacianalyst.org/ 
publications/analytical-articles/item/12786-uzbekistan-and-
Uzbekistan, in particular, embarked on a course 
of self-sufficiency and tried to reduce its dependencies 
as much as possible by means of economic unbun-
dling. Kazakhstan was occasionally obliged to follow 
its example. This resulted in conflicts over cross-
border electricity and gas supplies.22 In Soviet times, 
there was a joint Central Asian electricity grid which, 
in principle, still allows cross-border electricity trade 
today. However, Uzbekistan severed its connections to 
this regional electricity grid soon after independence, 
also cutting off Tajikistan in the process. Kazakhstan 
did not take this step officially, but the Kazakh grid 
operator took precautions to uncouple the country 
from the regional grid within a few hours.23 
Economic relations are also weak, while trade and 
investment are low. Uzbekistan not only isolated its 
economy but often closed borders or limited the ex-
port of certain goods without prior notice.24 In 2017, 
Uzbekistan was ranked 148th (Kazakhstan: 42nd) 
on the Index of Economic Freedom compiled by the 
Heritage Foundation.25 Although the two countries 
 
kazakhstan-competitors-strategic-partners-or-eternal-friends 
(accessed 11 August 2016). 
22 The Kazakh grid operator criticized Uzbekistan for repeat-
edly overstepping agreed volumes over a short period, result-
ing in frequent power outages in southern Kazakhstan. Vasilij 
Ivanov, “Dlja vychoda iz ob’edinennoj ėnergosistemy CA Ka-
zachstanu nuzhno neskol’ko dnej” [Kazakhstan requires only 
a few days to leave Central Asia’s joint energy system], Pano-
rama, 9 December 2011, http://www.kegoc.kz/ru/press-centr/ 
smi-o-kompanii/dlya-vyhoda-iz-obedinennoy-energosistemy-ca-
kazahstanu-nuzhno-neskolko (accessed 4 August 2016). 
23 “KEGOC vystupaet za razdel’nyj rezhim raboty ot ėnergo-
sistem Uzbekistana” [KEGOC calls for independence from 
Uzbekistan’s energy system], KEGOC (Kazakh power grid oper-
ator), 21 December 2001, http://www.kegoc.kz/ru/press-centr/ 
smi-o-kompanii/kegoc-vystupaet-za-razdelnyy-rezhim-raboty-
ot-energosistem-uzbekistana (accessed 9 August 2016). 
24 Cf. “Uzbekistan ogranichil ėksport fruktov i ovoshchej 
v Kazachstan” [Uzbekistan restricts export of fruit and veg-
etables to Kazakhstan], 365info, 16 November 2015, https:// 
365info.kz/2015/11/uzbekistan-93-kompaniyam-razreshili-
eksport-selhozproduktsii-v-kazahstan/ (accessed 12 December 
2016). 
25 The index measures factors concerning the rule of law, 
public spending and taxes, regulatory efficiency and market 
access. Heritage Foundation, 2017 Index of Economic Freedom: 
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have concluded a free trade agreement, it has had 
little effect so far.26 Uzbekistan is using customs duties 
to promote the export of processed products and to 
prevent products produced in its own market being 
imported. In order to protect domestic production and 
export industries, import duties of up to 120 percent 
are levied in some cases, e.g. for cars.27 Foreign invest-
ment is only possible in the export sector, with inves-
tors having to contend with a ban on converting cur-
rency and a state-regulated exchange rate system.28 
Uzbekistan’s difficult relationship with internatio-
nal treaties was also detrimental to trade, as the 
example of the TIR system (Transport Internationaux 
Routiers) shows. The TIR Convention regulates inter-
national road freight transport and allows lorries to 
transit through participating states more simply and 
cost-effectively. Uzbekistan is a member of the TIR Con-
vention but does not comply with the agreements. 
There is, for example, a convoy requirement for lor-
ries.29 In addition, there are high customs duties for 
import and transit. While Kazakhstan has lowered 
its fees for lorries to enter and exit the country from 
around $200 in 2000 to around $100 in 2010, Uzbeki-
stan still charges around $300.30 
Assessments of Uzbekistan’s strong economic iso-
lation have varied considerably. At times, observers 
have spoken of an Uzbek miracle as the country sur-
 
Kazakhstan, http://www.heritage.org/index/country/kazakhstan 
(accessed 9 December 2016). 
26 This applies to most trade policy contracts, see Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), Central Asia. Increasing Gains from 
Trade through Regional Cooperation in Trade Policy, Transport, and 
Customs Transit (Manila, 2006), 41. 
27 Bahodir Ganiev and Yuliy Yusupov, Uzbekistan: Trade Regime 
and Recent Trade Developments, Working Paper no. 4/2012 (Bish-
kek: University of Central Asia, Institute of Public Policy and 
Administration, 2012), 11–13. 
28 Pauline Jones Luong, “Political Obstacles to Economic 
Reform in Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan: 
Strategies for Moving Ahead”, in The Low-income Countries of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States. Progress and Challenges in 
Transition, ed. Clinton R. Shiells and Sarosh Sattar (Washing-
ton, D.C., 2004), 203–36. 
29 This information is based on an interview with a trade 
expert in Bishkek, September 2016. The TIR Convention was 
drafted under the coordination of the United Nations Eco-
nomic Comission for Europe (UNECE) and came into force 
in 1978. Uzbekistan joined in 1995. 
30 Elena Kulipanova, International Transport in Central Asia: 
Understanding the Patterns of (Non-) Cooperation, Working Paper 
no. 2/2012 (Bishkek: University of Central Asia, Institute of 
Public Policy and Administration, 2012), 15ff. In addition to 
these formal fees, informal payments are also required at the 
border. 
vived the international financial crises relatively un-
scathed and has been able to grow its own industry.31 
Others complain about the extreme lack of trans-
parency and the high long-term human and economic 
costs of the Uzbek economic model.32 However, data 
provided by Uzbekistan is considered untrustworthy, 
so caution should be exercised in assessing its economic 
situation.33 Kazakhstan, on the other hand, has pur-
sued a policy of openness to foreign investments from 
the outset and has tried to present itself as a reliable 
partner on the international stage. It has been a mem-
ber of the WTO since 2015 and is currently seeking 
membership of the OECD.34 In fact, foreign direct in-
vestment in Kazakhstan is the highest in the post-
Soviet area. 
The reasons for these totally different economic 
models lie mainly in the state-building processes em-
ployed after independence. Kazakhstan’s industry was 
controlled by Russia until 1991. In order to continue 
operating and modernizing, the country urgently 
needed foreign capital. At the beginning of the 1990s, 
it followed the neo-liberal state and economic model, 
as international financial institutions referred to it 
at the time. Adopted in 1993, its first constitution 
was democratic in nature. Although it was replaced 
by an authoritarian constitution in 1995,35 liberal eco-
nomic policy and its focus on foreign direct invest-
ment remained unchanged. From 1997, Kazakhstan
 
31 Richard Pomfret, Central Asia since 1991: The Experience of 
the New Independent States, Working Paper no. 212 (Paris: OECD 
Development Centre, July 2003), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/ 
development/central-asia-since-1991_738202560358 (accessed 
9 December 2016). 
32 On human rights infringements in Uzbekistan, see e.g., 
Hugh Williamson, “Nicht länger wegschauen”, Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung, 21 September 2016, http://www.nzz.ch/meinung/ 
kommentare/menschenrechtsverletzungen-in-usbekistan-
nicht-laenger-wegschauen-ld.117715 (accessed 1 December 
2016). 
33 Economist Intelligence Unit, Uzbekistan, 2016. 
34 Kasachstan has been a member of the World Trade 
Organization since the end of 2015, cf. WTO, “Kazakhstan 
Joins the WTO as 162nd Member”, 30 November 2015, 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/acc_kaz_ 
30nov15_e.htm (accessed 9 December 2016); OECD, “OECD 
Bolsters Relationship with Kazakhstan – Signs Kazakhstan 
Country Programme Agreement”, 22 January 2015, http:// 
www.oecd.org/newsroom/oecd-bolsters-relationship-with-
kazakhstan-signs-kazakhstan-country-programme-agreement. 
htm (accessed 9 December 2016). 
35 Otto Luchterhandt, “Präsidentialismus in den GUS-Staaten”, 
in Neue Regierungssysteme in Osteuropa und der GUS. Probleme der 
Ausbildung stabiler Machtinstitutionen, ed. Otto Luchterhandt, 
second edition (Berlin, 2002), 268–79. 
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Table 3 
Economic data for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
 Kazakhstan 
 2014 2015 2016 
Uzbekistan 
2014 2015 2016 
Population in millions  17.29  17.54  17.80 30.76 31.30 31.85 
GDP in billions of US dollars 221.40 184.40 133.70 63.00 66.90 67.20 
GDP per capita in US dollars 12,800 10,500 7,500 2,000 2,100 2,100 
GDP growth in percent  4.2  1.2  0.9  8.1  8.0  7.3 
a The Economist Intelligence Unit considers data reported by Uzbekistan unreliable. 
They should, therefore, only be considered rough guidelines. 
Source: World Bank. 
 
freed itself from the neo-liberal model and began to 
pursue a developmental state approach in which the 
state was the major driver of the economy.36 However, 
it maintained its basic openness to foreign investors 
and strong links to foreign markets. Kazakhstan also 
operated a firm policy of social openness. The govern-
ment enabled more than 11,000 students to study 
abroad in industrialized countries through the Bola-
shak scholarship programme.37 
In contrast, Uzbekistan moved in a completely dif-
ferent direction. Unlike Kazakhstan, there was neither 
a ‘democratic experiment’ nor any significant privati-
zation. Uzbekistan has considerable energy resources 
and high domestic demand which explains its interest 
in self-sufficiency and its unwillingness to engage in 
binding cooperation.38 In addition, the establishment 
of a closed, patrimonial-authoritarian ruling system 
meant that regime security took precedence. 
Economic upheaval and reform pressure 
Kazakhstan’s economic crisis has several causes. The 
country’s largest source of income is the export of 
natural resources, mainly oil. Attempts at economic 
diversification in the 2000s had little success. As a 
result, the country is directly affected by the impact 
of the low oil price. It also suffered indirectly from 
the Russian economic crisis, which was also caused by 
the fall in oil prices, and the consequences of China’s 
 
36 Andrea Schmitz, Kasachstan: neue Führungsmacht im post-
sowjetischen Raum?, SWP-Studie 7/2009 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, March 2009), 12ff. 
37 Data from programme website, http://bolashak.gov.kz 
(accessed 12 January 2017). 
38 European Parliament, Uzbekistan: Selected Trade and Economic 
Issues (Brussels, September 2013), 6. 
weak growth also affected Kazakhstan. While China’s 
growth can pick up again, the oil price is not expected 
to rise again above the $100 mark. The high prices 
allowed Kazakhstan to enjoy growth rates of more 
than ten percent from 1999. But, in 2014, growth fell 
for the first time to under five percent and in early 
2016 there was even a recession. A maximum of three 
percent growth per annum is expected in the coming 
years. High inflation and the depreciation of the 
national currency have already led to lower household 
incomes for the middle class.39 
Uzbekistan is also struggling with an economic 
crisis. The country has long insisted on economic pro-
tectionism and developing its export industry. As a 
result, it has achieved astounding growth rates for 
many years and survived the international financial 
crises almost unscathed. Meanwhile, the Uzbek model 
is reaching its limits. Due to the lack of effective reforms 
under President Karimov, unemployment had multi-
plied and remittances of Uzbek migrant workers had 
become increasingly important. Since remittances 
were shrinking and Russia had become an overall 
small, but from an Uzbek perspective, important sales 
market, the country has been hit by the Russian eco-
nomic crisis. China’s weak economic development 
has also been felt in Uzbekistan.40 
 
39 However, this would not necessarily lead to potential 
protest. See also economic data from Economist Intelligence 
Unit, Kazakhstan. Country Report (London, 3 November 2016). 
40 Paul Stronski, Uzbekistan at Twenty-Five: What Next? (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
21 March 2016), http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/03/21/ 
uzbekistan-at-twenty-five-what-next-pub-63083 (accessed 20 
November 2016); Economist Intelligence Unit, Uzbekistan 
(see note 33). 
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Moreover, Uzbekistan harbours fears that the 
country might become marginalized in the region.41 
In the official version, Uzbekistan is proud of its self-
imposed independence. In fact, the two major regional 
projects, the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk 
Road Initiative, could become a problem for various 
reasons. This is particularly true for the EAEU. Uzbeki-
stan cannot become a member, for now, because the 
country would have to surrender sovereignty.42 The 
EAEU, and especially its customs union, counteract 
Uzbekistan’s export strategy.43 Uzbekistan can no 
longer exclusively negotiate bilaterally with the mem-
ber states of the EAEU and runs the risk of no longer 
being able to export certain products. Furthermore, 
the introduction of EAEU-wide standards would 
require difficult adjustments. When, for example, the 
2015 Economic Union imposed new safety standards 
for cars, Uzbekistan was no longer able to export its 
cars to the EAEU area and had to first alter its produc-
tion processes.44 Above all, Russia can use import 
restrictions as a means to exert political pressure on 
Uzbekistan. 
The former, now deceased, President Islom Karimov 
tried to find a way out of this dilemma. Although he 
rejected Uzbekistan joining the EAEU several times, 
instead, he proposed a ‘privileged partnership’ called 
‘EAEU plus Uzbekistan’. In 2013, two years after the 
Customs Union came into force and shortly before the 
start of the EAEU Economic Area, Uzbekistan became 
a member of the free trade area of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS). This had both symbolic 
and material reasons. In terms of its original objecti-
ves, the CIS free trade area was considered a failure.45 
Accession did not place any obligations on Uzbekistan 
but allowed it to hold it up as a symbol against the 
burgeoning image of an increasingly isolated country. 
In material terms, the CIS free trade area was also rele-
vant in that it provides a framework for bilateral trade 
negotiations. However, the government has so far 
 
41 Interview with an Uzbek expert, Almaty, September 2016. 
42 See also Vsevolod Samokhvalov, “The New Eurasia: Post-
Soviet Space between Russia, Europe and China”, European 
Politics and Society 17, no. 1 (2016): 82–96, http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1080/23745118.2016.1171285 (accessed 25 May 2017). 
43 “Rasshrenie EAĖS so vremenem privedet k izoljacii 
Uzbekistana” [Expanding the EAEU will lead to Uzbekistan’s 
isolation in the long term], Regnum, 7 December 2015, https:// 
regnum.ru/news/2029866.html (accessed 1 December 2016). 
44 Interview with trade experts, Astana, September 2016. 
45 Martha Brill Olcott, Anders Åslund and Sherman W. Gar-
nett, Getting It Wrong. Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (Washington, D.C., 1999). 
refused to join free trade areas which are subject to 
greater restrictions on sovereignty. This was most 
recently confirmed at the Shanghai Organization for 
Cooperation (SCO) summit in Tashkent in June 2016.46 
However, the SREB initiative does threaten to leave 
Uzbekistan behind. Kazakhstan is already China’s 
most important partner in Central Asia and has the 
greatest chance of benefiting economically from the 
initiative. However, if Uzbekistan is unwilling to im-
plement reforms, it will increasingly fall behind its 
neighbour Kazakhstan. 
Overall, it can be said that pressure on both coun-
tries to reform has increased. As domestic interest in 
reforms has grown, the effect of external reform in-
centives has also intensified. Consequently, reforms 
in the economy and political institutions appear more 
probable than previously. A further slight rise in energy 
prices would lessen the pressure somewhat, but would 
not alter the structural problems. 
Nation building and 
political institutionalization 
The current situation in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
is also different from that of the 1990s because state 
power is more institutionalized. Prior to 1991, the 
Soviet republics of Central Asia had limited decision-
making powers. The highest office in the republics, 
that of President of the Party and Council of Ministers, 
was occupied by Soviet leadership and not through 
free elections or decisions by the republics’ elites. The 
Politburo in Moscow had significant influence on the 
career opportunities of the local cadres in Central Asia 
who were strongly oriented towards Moscow as a result. 
The Centre was also responsible for regional, foreign 
policy and many national economic issues. Large 
swathes of industry in Central Asia were owned by 
Moscow’s Soviet bureaucracy. Within this framework, 
however, the national elites were still able to make 
their own decisions on domestic issues. 
As a result, the 1990s saw the institutionalization 
of independent statehood, the development and im-
plementation of central policies, such as economic 
and foreign policy, reorganization of government 
structures and the establishment of hierarchies. In 
 
46 “Uzbekistan ne podderzhal predlozhenie Kitaja o sozdanii 
zony svobodnoj torgovli v ramkach SHOS” (Interfaks) [Uzbe-
kistan rejects China’s proposal to set up a free trade area as 
part of SCO], Express K, 16 December 2015, http://www.express-
k.kz/news/?ELEMENT_ID=62623 (accessed 8 October 2016). 
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addition, since the communist ideology had failed as a 
coherently symbolic order overnight, the states had to 
replace it with their own value systems. 
Both states have a strong concentration of power at 
the executive level, especially directly with the presi-
dent. Important administrative structures were also 
established in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, mainly in 
the field of security, but also in finance and tax ad-
ministration. Not least, both countries leaned towards 
specific economic models.47 Moreover, a presidential 
party (Nur Otan) was created to institutionalize politi-
cal power in Kazakhstan. While Uzbekistan’s President, 
Islom Karimov, developed an extremely repressive re-
gime, Kazakhstan’s President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, 
strived to establish legitimacy primarily through 
growth and by giving the population economic partici-
pation. In the 1990s, the countries had to thoroughly 
reinvent themselves. This was achieved at the political 
level by forming foreign policy identities and at the 
administrative level by creating their own foreign 
ministries. Ideologically, Kazakhstan initially estab-
lished an authoritarian-neoliberal order and chose 
economic progress as its credo. Uzbekistan’s symbolic 
order, on the other hand, was based mainly on tra-
ditional-historical values.Greater institutionalization 
of politics and functioning hierarchies have not yet 
caused any reforms. But they do create more favorable 
conditions because they reduce any uncertainty actors 
may have in the change process and increase con-
trollability. In the regime’s view, this is especially true 
of difficult reforms affecting the system of political 
power and sovereignty. 
China’s rise in Central Asia 
The period since the turn of the millennium has been 
dominated by the rise of China in Central Asia. The 
states of Central Asia play a subordinate role in Bei-
jing’s foreign policy strategy. However, China’s Cen-
tral Asia policy comes under the category of its neigh-
bourhood policy which, in its foreign policy ranking, 
is second only to relations with major powers.48 The 
volume of trade between Kazakhstan and China came 
to over €7 billion in 2016 which accounted for 12.7 
percent of Kazakhstan’s total foreign trade. In con-
 
47 See also e.g. in area of central banks Juliet Johnson, Priests 
of Prosperity. How Central Bankers Transformed the Postcommunist 
World (Ithaca, 2016). 
48 Weiqing Song, China’s Approach to Central Asia. The Shanghai 
Co-operation Organisation (London, 2016), 4, 11. 
trast, the value of trade between China and Uzbeki-
stan in absolute terms only came to €3.34 billion, but 
20.8 percent of total Uzbek foreign trade. 
China is now the most important trading partner, 
investor, lender and purchaser of energy supplies for 
Central Asia. Since the 2000s, China has been the 
main importer of crude oil and natural gas from the 
region and, as a result, has become their most impor-
tant trading partner. Due to its constantly increasing 
demand for energy, China has been dependent on im-
ports of oil since 1993 and on gas since 1993. Accord-
ing to estimates, the country will have to cover two 
thirds of its oil demand from imports by 2022.49 
Trade between China and Central Asia is anything 
but balanced. Around 85 percent of China’s exports 
to Central Asia are processed products and consumer 
goods. In the case of imports from Central Asia, the 
ratio of unprocessed products is also 85 percent. These 
are primarily energy resources and metals. For a long 
time, the majority of trade went through Kyrgyzstan 
and the goods imported from China were resold from 
there. This has changed markedly since the Eurasian 
Economic Union was established in 2014. 
China’s main oil supplier in Central Asia is Kazakh-
stan, from whom China purchased two percent of its 
total oil imports in 2014.50 China made an agreement 
with Uzbekistan on gas supplies in 2009. However, 
while Uzbekistan’s gas exports to China certainly play 
a role, they do not appear in China’s energy mix as 
they amount to less than 0.4 percent.51 
China has, at the very least, caught up with Russia 
as a major investor in Central Asia. Officially, China 
had invested $6 billion in Uzbekistan by 2016, accord-
ing to Russia’s own figures.52 China’s investments in 
 
49 Julia Kusznir and Karen Smith Stegen, “Outcomes and 
Strategies in the ‘New Great Game’: China and the Caspian 
States Emerge as Winners”, Journal of Eurasian Studies 6, no. 2 
(2015): 91–106 (101). 
50 Nick Cunningham, “The Battle for China’s Oil Market”, Oil-
price.com, 15 July 2015, http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/ 
The-Battle-For-Chinas-Oil-Market.html (accessed 19 December 
2016). 
51 Cf. Konstantin L. Syroezhkin, Kazachstan – Kitaj: ot pogra-
nichnoj torgovli k strategicheskomu partnerstvu [Kazakhstan – China: 
from border trade to strategic partnership] (Аlmaty, 2010); 
BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2012 (London, June 2012), 
http://www.bp.com/de_at/austria/presse/presseinformationen/ 
61-bp-statistical-review-2012.html. Turkmenistan is China’s 
most important gas supplier. 
52 “China Catches Up with Russia as Major Investor in Uz-
bekistan” (Reuters), Daily Mail Online, 24 May 2016, http:// 
www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/reuters/article-3607446/China-
catches-Russia-major-investor-Uzbekistan.html. 
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Map 
Current and future high-speed connections between China and Europe 
 
Kazakhstan exceeded this amount considerably. This 
is particularly evident in relations in the energy sec-
tor. All 22 Chinese energy companies are active in the 
Kazakh oil sector, while ten Kazakhstan companies are 
100-percent Chinese owned. Approximately 40 percent 
of the Kazakh oil sector is controlled by Chinese com-
panies, including the China National Petroleum Cor-
poration (CNPC).53 China is also investing in the Kazakh 
banking sector. A new kind of investment partnership 
is transferring 51 Chinese factories to Kazakhstan. The 
two countries agreed this undertaking in September 
2016. The total investment sum is around $26 billion.54 
In addition to bilateral economic relations, China 
can boast of two successful projects in the region. The 
China–Central Asia gas pipeline is China’s first trans-
national infrastructure project in the region. The pipe-
line, which is 1833 kilometres long, was completed in 
2009 and will mainly transport Turkmen gas to China. 
The pipeline is enormously important since China 
meets nearly 50 percent of its gas demand with Turk-
 
53 Kusznir and Stegen, “Outcomes and Strategies” (see 
note 49), 101. 
54 “Kazachstan i Kitaj sozdadut 51 sovmestnoe predprijatie” 
[Kazakhstan and China set up five joint factories], Kapital, 
5 September 2016, https://kapital.kz/economic/53329/ 
kazahstan-i-kitaj-sozdadut-51-sovmestnoe-predpriyatie.html 
(accessed 16 December 2016). 
men gas.55 It was built through joint ventures between 
CNPC and companies in the respective countries, in 
the case of Uzbekistan with state-owned Uzbeknefte-
gaz.56 In Kazakhstan, Aziatskij Gazoprovod was founded 
especially for this project.57 However, the pipeline was 
negotiated exclusively with the Central Asian states in 
bilateral mode. Unlike the transit issue, no institutio-
nal reforms or intensive cooperation between the 
countries are required for the construction and opera-
tion of the gas pipeline. Nevertheless, the project also 
has a regional dimension. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
have the option of feeding in their own gas or pur-
chasing gas for themselves. According to Kazakhstan, 
the amount of gas transported to China in 2016 was 
over 34 billion cubic metres, while Kazakhstan itself 
received more than one billion cubic metres.58 
 
55 Murat Sadykov, “Turkmenistan Supplying over Half 
of Chinese Gas Imports”, Eurasianet, 6 August 2013. 
56 Eric Watkins, “Uzbekneftegaz, CNPC form Asia Trans 
Gas Joint Venture”, Oil & Gas Journal, 14 April 2008. 
57 Konstantin Syroezhkin, “Kazachstan i Kitaj: analiz pos-
lednich dogovorennostej” [Kazakhstan and China: analysis 
of recently concluded contracts], Cabar, 3 November 2016. 
58 See data from Ag Processing Inc (AGP), Asia Gas Pipeline – 
Breakthrough Energy, http://www.agp.com.kz/?page_id=1298 
(accessed 10 March 2017). 
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The second regional project initiated and promoted 
by China is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
(SCO). It is important because it succeeded in estab-
lishing a stable multilateral forum in the field of non-
traditional security through its choice of suitable 
bespoke topics and appropriate organizational form. 
While Uzbekistan has already twice left the Russian-
dominated OVKS, it continues to be a member of the 
SCO without interruption. The SCO allowed China to 
succeed in testing and consolidating a Chinese leader-
ship role in the region and, at the same time, involving 
Russia.59 However, the SCO was not successful in every 
respect. In addition to traditional security, China tried 
to strengthen the economic dimension of the Organi-
sation. This included promoting good bilateral rela-
tions between the Central Asian states. The Chinese 
government’s proposals to set up an SCO free trade 
area were, however, rejected several times, albeit not 
as vehemently as before. 
China’s role is perceived differently among the 
populations and political elites of the Central Asian 
states. The inhabitants of Central Asia tend to display 
characteristics of both sinophobia and sinophilia. As 
it increasingly expanded its economic commitment, 
China also sought to increase its legitimacy in the 
region, primarily through study grants and language 
courses. Parts of the population are still suspicious 
of their new regional superpower.60 Furthermore, 
attempts were made to exploit anti-Chinese sentiment 
to mobilize against the regime. Among the political 
elites of Central Asia, on the other hand, Chinese 
commitment is predominantly welcomed.61 China’s 
approach differed greatly from that of Russia. As an 
equally influential regional superpower, Russia at-
taches little importance to stronger intra-regional 
cooperation, but rather to post-hegemonial control. 
 
59 Stephen Aris, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: 
‘Tackling the Three Evils’. A Regional Response to Non-tradi-
tional Security Challenges or an Anti-Western Bloc?”, Europe-
Asia Studies 61, no. 3 (2009): 57–482; Nadine Godehardt, The 
Chinese Constitution of Central Asia. Regions and Intertwined Actors 
in International Relations (Basingstoke, 2014), 98–127. 
60 Marlène Laruelle and Sébastien Peyrouse, The Chinese Ques-
tion in Central Asia. Domestic Order, Social Change, and the Chinese 
Factor (London, 2012): 97–116. 
61 See also Martha Brill Olcott, China’s Unmatched Influence in 
Central Asia (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace, 18 September 2013), http://carnegieendowment. 
org/2013/09/18/china-s-unmatched-influence-in-central-asia/ 
gnky (accessed 10 March 2017). 
In contrast, China is more interested in good neigh-
bourly relations among the states.62 
It is certainly the case that China’s rise in Central 
Asia has given the country more power in the region. 
This has also increased the chances for diffusion pro-
cesses. However, these are by no means automatic 
because they depend on a variety of other factors.63 
 
 
 
62 Chinese experts have been highlighting this for some 
time, cf. Godehardt, The Chinese Constitution of Central Asia 
(see note 59). 
63 See the following two chapters. 
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The Silk Road Initiative as an incentive for reform in Central Asia 
 
The Belt and Road Initiative and its component rele-
vant to Central Asia, the Silk Road Economic Belt, are 
important projects in which a variety of geostrategic 
practices and objectives are revealed. The initiative 
will not be comprehensively analyzed here. Rather, 
the focus is primarily on the plan to transport export 
goods by high-speed rail from China to Europe. As 
shown below, this is an incentive to change coopera-
tive behavior as well as to stimulate and strengthen 
reforms. 
The Belt and Road Initiative, including the SREB 
subproject, was presented in 2013. Although the 
proposal was initially vague, clear outlines are now 
emerging of the objectives and methods first set out 
in a strategy paper published in the spring of 2015. 
In addition, institutional structures and financing 
mechanisms have since been created and agreements 
concluded with partner countries and organizations.64 
Belt and Road is not an integration initiative like 
the Eurasian Economic Union. As such, it would have 
no chance in Central Asia and would also lead to a 
confrontation with Russia.65 Officially, the Chinese 
government refers to Belt and Road as an initiative. 
Beijing’s choice of words is aimed at emphasizing 
openness and preventing any association with Chinese 
overpowerment or even restricting sovereign rights. 
The Chinese leadership expressly rejects frequently 
expressed suspicion that the aim of the project is to 
pursue its geopolitical ambitions. It is a “proposal for 
economic cooperation, not a tool of geopolitics”. On 
the other hand, the term ‘initiative’ emphasizes that 
all partners must make considerable efforts. The ini-
tiative is “a unilateral move that requires willing 
cooperation from others who also have stakes in the 
provision of the public good”.66 
 
64 Nadine Godehardt, No End of History. A Chinese Alternative 
Concept of International Order?, SWP Research Paper 2/2016 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2016), 18. 
65 Alexander Libman, “Linking the Silk Road Economic Belt 
and the Eurasian Economic Union: Mission Impossible?”, 
Caucasus International 6, no. 1 (2016): 41–53. 
66 Xie Tao, “Is China’s ‘Belt and Road’ a Strategy?”, The Diplo-
mat, 16 December 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/is-
chinas-belt-and-road-a-strategy/ (accessed 25 May 2017). 
The routes through Central Asia are known as the 
western route, in contrast to the middle route, which 
crosses Mongolia and Russia to Europe. A complex net-
work of fast routes would be established for the Cen-
tral Asian Corridor, leading through all states except 
Tajikistan. The trains would need to cross many bor-
ders on their way to Europe. It is important that a 
variety of alternative routes are available within a cor-
ridor for economic and political reasons. Transport 
companies would require alternative routes in case of 
bottlenecks. If there are several alternative routes, this 
encourages competition between the states to trans-
port as many goods as possible along their route. It 
might also have a positive effect on the diffusion of 
trade facilitation measures. In political terms, too, 
alternative routes are essential because they prevent 
a single country from gaining control over the entire 
infrastructure. 
Kazakhstan forms the central point of the routes 
through Central Asia. It currently has the only rail 
link with China. Another alternative in Central Asia 
is the route through Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, 
although the Kyrgyz section has not been built yet. 
One of the planned high-speed routes leads from 
China to Uzbekistan via Kazakhstan. It runs from the 
Chinese-Kazakh border town of Khorgos via Almaty, 
along the south Kazakh border via Schymkent to Uz-
bekistan and, from there, to Afghanistan or via Turk-
menistan to Iran,67 along CAREC Corridors 1–3. 
These future high-speed rail links will be part of 
international transport corridors. According to inter-
national standards, these are multimodal which means 
they not only need railways but also high-quality roads 
and other infrastructure, including logistics centres 
and hotels. Institutional infrastructure is also impor-
tant and this applies to customs duties as well as to 
entry and residence regulations which ensure the free 
movement of goods and people.68 
 
67 China has already publicly tested train routes between 
China–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan–Afghanistan and further via 
Turkmenistan to Iran. 
68 Kulipanova, International Transport in Central Asia (see 
note 30). 
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Promoting institutions: economic openness, 
cooperation, border reforms 
According to the Chinese National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), the Silk Road Initiative is 
not limited to the technical implementation of infra-
structure projects. Furthermore, in its policy paper, 
the Commission advocates certain guidelines and 
policies in Central Asia because it considers them im-
portant for the implementation of the initiative. They 
are part of “an ambitious economic vision of the open-
ing-up of and cooperation among the countries along 
the Belt and Road”.69 One can also interpret the Chi-
nese Silk Road Initiative as an attempt to achieve a 
diffusion or transfer of institutions.70 
The NDRC is of the opinion that it would be advis-
able for Central Asian countries to pursue a policy of 
economic openness. The Commission promises, above 
all, better conditions for trade and direct Chinese in-
vestment, an important element in China’s new eco-
nomic policy strategy.71 Should the Central Asian 
countries want to follow this model, this would mean 
a fundamental change in policy, especially for Uzbeki-
stan. Kazakhstan, on the other hand, which has been 
strongly integrated into the world market since the 
early 1990s, would only have to further develop prin-
ciples it has already implemented. 
The NDRC also believes good intergovernmental 
cooperation, including political trust, is required for 
the Silk Road Initiative to be a success. This would 
apply not only to bilateral relations between China 
and its partner countries but also to relations among 
them. Unlike its comments on the openness policy, 
which it calls the ‘economic vision’, the Commission is 
clearer on this point: “The countries should cooperate 
more closely [...] and build political trust.” However, 
Uzbekistan would have to fundamentally change its 
 
69 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 
Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt 
and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (Beijing, 2015), 3, http://en. 
ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html 
(accessed 2 December 2016). 
70 The term ‘institution’ should not be confused with that of 
the organization, in terms of political science it is understood 
to mean an ensemble of formal and informal rules and pro-
cedures, cf. definition on page 8 of the present Research Paper. 
71 Wang Yiwei, “One Belt, One Road: Die neuen Seidenstra-
ßen. Eine chinesische Sicht”, Welt Trends 24, no. 116 (2016): 
30–35 (30). Beijing will most likely favour transferring its own 
model to Central Asia. Accordingly, a gradual and partial eco-
nomic opening up should take place, but strong social con-
trol and authoritarianism should be maintained. 
hitherto erratic cooperation behavior and show far 
more consideration for its partners. Kazakhstan, on 
the other hand, sometimes accepts drawbacks in order 
to maintain cooperation and is an advocate of multi-
lateral approaches, as evidenced by its commitment to 
the EAEU. In addition, Kazakh experts emphasize that 
Uzbekistan, under Karimov, was seldom willing to sit 
down with others to find a solution to intergovern-
mental conflicts.72 
The NDRC also indirectly addresses the issue of bor-
der reforms by calling for secure and efficient corri-
dors and border crossings to be established.73 In addi-
tion to technical factors, such as the modernization 
and construction of hard infrastructure as well as 
modern logistics and digitization of border process-
ing, the Commission is referring, in particular, to 
institutions and administration. Here, China is likely 
to seek, first and foremost, efficient border manage-
ment that works without corruption and competition 
between authorities, and ideally involves cooperation 
with its neighbours. Previous Chinese practice would 
indicate this does not mean opening up the borders or 
liberalizing its border entry arrangements. China still 
prioritizes the security aspects of border protection 
and entry. Cooperation at the border and reform of 
border authorities are considerable challenges for 
both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 
On the one hand, China still adheres to the principle 
of not interfering in the internal affairs of other coun-
tries. On the other hand, however, the country makes 
surprisingly broad demands on the partner countries 
of the Silk Road Initiative, namely economic openness, 
intergovernmental cooperation and institutional 
reforms. By advocating reform, China is highlighting 
policies in the partner countries that, in its view, are 
ideal for implementing the Belt and Road Initiative. 
Whether and how these reforms are implemented is 
the responsibility of the partner countries. A country 
that implements lots of reforms would, therefore, 
benefit more from the initiative while anti-reformists 
would be out of the game. This loose, voluntary ap-
proach is in line with official doctrine and, with some 
limitations, represents China’s practical approach to 
its foreign policy. 
 
72 Interview with a policy expert, Astana, September 2016. 
73 “[...] a secure and efficient network of land, sea and air 
passages”, NDRC, Vision and Actions (see note 69), 4. 
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SREB will not work without border 
management reforms 
In order for goods to be transported quickly to West-
ern countries within the framework of the initiative, 
the Central Asian countries will need to implement 
reforms. The plan would see roughly one percent of 
goods traded between China and Europe transported 
by rail across three corridors to Europe, the Middle 
East and Africa. To date, there have only been two 
modes of transport available: fast but expensive flights 
and slow but inexpensive shipments by sea. Such goods 
are suitable for rail transportation, whereby the com-
promises are higher prices than shipment by sea and 
longer despatch times than by air. This includes per-
ishable products such as meat and fish products, grain 
and fruit, but also other goods, such as automobiles 
and wood.74 
In a transitional period, China will subsidize ex-
ports in order to reduce transport and trading costs.75 
In the longer term, however, the process will only be 
worthwhile for the export industry and the logistics 
sector if the trains are able to travel the distance 
quickly enough for transport costs to be reduced 
considerably. Nevertheless, the problems of border 
management in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, particu-
larly the long waiting times, are contrary to the re-
quirements of the Chinese government. In its CR 
Express Building and Development Plan (2016–2020) 
from October 2015, the Chinese government has set 
out a maximum waiting period of six hours for cus-
toms formalities. In addition, some products are to 
be given preferential treatment.76 
Organizations and models of 
institutional transfer 
China cooperates with expert organizations which call 
for introducing certain border management models. 
For example, the country is participating in the CAREC 
programme (see Box 1, p. 9), which has been promot-
ing trade since 1997 and deals with issues relating to 
 
74 “CR Express Development Plan (2016–2020)”, 8 October 
2016, http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbghwb/201610/P020161 
017547345656182.pdf (accessed 9 November 2016). 
75 Ivan Zuenko, Why China Subsidizes Loss-Making Rail Transport 
via Russia and Kazakhstan (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 
13 September 2016), http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa= 
64555 (accessed 1 December 2016). 
76 Cf. “CR Express Development Plan” (see note 74). 
Box 2: The Trans-Eurasia-Express from Chongqing 
to Duisburg 
There has been a high-speed route between China 
and Germany, running through Kazakhstan and 
Russia, since 2012. The Trans-Eurasia Express con-
nects Chongqing in China with Duisburg in 
Germany. The trains take 18 days to travel the 
route.a The border crossing to Kazakhstan is at 
Khorgos. 
This high-speed freight transit route is made 
possible by a technically modernized tranship-
ment station, the standardized CIM/SMGS con-
signment note as well as simplified customs 
regulations which prevent long waiting times at 
the border, especially in Khorgos. According to 
local observers, informal agreements also simplify 
the procedure.b As a result, the project is some-
times referred to as a ‘secret weapon’ by interna-
tional trade experts.c 
a S. Frederick Starr, Svante E. Cornell and Nicklas Norling, 
The EU, Central Asia, and the Development of Continental Transport 
and Trade, Silk Road Paper(Washington, D.C., and Stockholm: 
December 2015), https://silkroadstudies.org/resources/2015-
starr-cornell-norling-eu-central-asia-continental-transport-
and-trade.pdf (accessed 8 December 2016). 
b Interview with a local expert, Almaty, September 2016. 
c Observation by the author at a trade conference in 
Almaty, September 2016. 
border management. Its most important unit is 
the Customs Cooperation Committee. According to 
CAREC’s current strategy, the management of at least 
five border crossings should also include cooperation 
with neighbouring countries.77 A particular feature of 
the organization is that it is not only responsible for 
transferring knowledge, but also implementing infra-
structure projects and promoting corridor develop-
ment.78 
In addition to the CAREC programme, the Chinese 
government has also concluded new partnerships. In 
April 2014, Beijing and the United Nations Economic 
 
77 Only one of which is located in Central Asia. Telephone 
interview with a policy expert, Berlin, January 2017; see also 
ADB, CAREC Transport and Trade Facilitation Strategy 2020 (Manila, 
2014). 
78 The latest CAREC database contains 43 concluded and cur-
rent projects in Kazakhstan (as of 2015) and 37 in Uzbekistan 
(as of 2017). See http://www.carecprogram.org/index.php? 
page=kazakhstan-projects and http://www.carecpro gram.org/ 
index.php?page=uzbekistan-projects (accessed 19 June 2017). 
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and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN 
ESCAP) formulated a joint declaration of intent.79 
China has also concluded a cooperation agreement 
with its sister organization, the United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe (UNECE). These part-
nerships are aimed at increasing transport security 
and facilitating trade. As part of its cooperation with 
UNECE, China has also joined the TIR Convention.80 
These agreements are intended to explicitly support 
the Belt and Road Initiative. Among other things, the 
partners are committed to promoting trade facili-
tation and paperless cross-border trade. The UN’s two 
regional economic and social commissions have been 
actively promoting trade and border-crossing facili-
tation for decades. They are responsible for a number 
of standards and international agreements, such as 
the TIR system. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are mem-
bers of both organizations. 
The highest decision-making body of the UNECE is 
the Inland Transport Committee (ITC). Its main task is 
to facilitate cross-border trade. It is also responsible for 
customs duties and border management. In addition, 
UN ESCAP and UNECE are calling for implementation 
of the World Trade Organization’s Trade Facilitation 
Agreement (TFA). Its objective is to harmonize customs 
clearance, to ensure greater transparency at the bor-
ders, to promote cooperation between customs author-
ities and combat corruption. 
In 1982, the UNECE paved the way for the Inter-
national Convention on the Harmonization of Fron-
tier Controls of Goods, the aim of which was to better 
coordinate the work of customs authorities and other 
governmental bodies.81 The Convention came into 
force in 1985 and was amended twice. Annex 9, which 
 
79 “China-UNESCAP Deal to Boost Belt and Road Initiative 
Cooperation”, China Daily, 12 April 2016. 
80 UNECE, “UNECE and China to Cooperate to Help Coun-
tries Participating in the ‘One Belt One Road’ Initiative to 
Implement PPP Projects” (Geneva, 21 December 2016), http:// 
www.unece.org/info/media/presscurrent-press-h/general-
unece/2016/unece-and-china-to-cooperate-to-help-countries-
participating-in-the-one-belt-one-road-initiative-to-implement-
ppp-projects/doc.html (accessed 21 July 2017); UNECE, “State-
ment by Mr. Christian Friis Bach, United Nations Under-Secre-
tary-General, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, at ‘Belt and Road’ Forum for 
International Cooperation Session on Connectivity of Devel-
opment Policies and Strategies” (Beijing, 14 May 2017), http:// 
www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/Speech_14_May_2017_final__
Beijing.pdf (accessed 21 July 2017). 
81 UNECE, International Convention on the Harmonization of 
Frontier Controls of Goods (Geneva, 21 October 1982). Uzbekistan 
joined the convention in 1996, Kazakhstan in 2005. 
defines standards for the facilitation of border cross-
ing procedures for international rail freight, was 
adopted in 2011. It also recommends using the stand-
ardized CIM/SMGS consignment note which combines 
the standards of Western and Eastern rail organiza-
tions.82 
These international standards are implemented 
in the Coordinated Border Management (CBM) model 
which is favoured by UNECE and other organizations.83 
CBM works on two levels: Internally, it promotes 
better coordination between all national authorities 
involved in border management. In addition to cus-
toms and security authorities, these often include 
veterinary and sanitary control institutions. At the 
intergovernmental level, the model provides for regu-
lated and formalized cooperation between neigh-
bouring countries at their respective borders. The key 
elements of this intergovernmental cooperation are 
communication and exchange of information. 
The implementation of CBM, therefore, presupposes 
domestic reforms and intergovernmental cooperation. 
In this way, customs formalities can be processed much 
more quickly. For example, New Zealand has been able 
to reduce its average clearance time from 240 to 0.2 
hours and Costa Rica from 144 to 0.2–1.9 hours.84 There 
are also examples of intergovernmental cooperation 
on the borders of the CAREC Corridors. The Chinese 
and Mongolian authorities are planning to intensify 
their cooperation on Corridor 4. The two customs 
authorities are currently preparing a pilot phase for 
joint customs controls and the use of a joint electronic 
procedure. Customs processing has already been sim-
plified and transit times have been reduced consider-
ably.85 In addition, the Chinese customs authorities 
have concluded agreements with Tajikistan and Kyr-
 
82 The CIM/SMGS consignment note is based on the Agree-
ment on International Freight Traffic by Rail between the 
‘western’ International Union of Railways and ‘eastern’ Orga-
nisation for Cooperation of Railways. 
83 Another programme with which the UN is promoting 
cooperation between neighbouring countries is the Vienna 
Programme of Action for Landlocked Developing Countries 
for the Decade 2014–2024. Kazakhstan und Uzbekistan are 
partner countries in this programme. 
84 UNECE, Spectrum of Border Crossing Facilitation Activities 
2015 (New York, 2015), 10, http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/ 
DAM/trans/bcf/publications/Spectrum_of_Border_Crossing_ 
Facilitations_Activities.pdf (accessed 6 January 2017). 
85 ADB, CAREC Corridor Performance Measurement & Monitoring. 
Annual Report 2015 (Manila, 2015), iv–1, http://www. carecpro-
gram.org/uploads/docs/CAREC-Publications/2015-CAREC-
CPMM-Annual-Report.pdf (accessed 8 December 2016). 
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gyzstan in order to get perishable goods across the 
border more quickly.86 
Intergovernmental cooperation in a sensitive area 
such as border management requires a culture of trust 
between the states in question. It is particularly im-
portant to establish functioning communication 
and to adhere to contracts and agreements. However, 
Uzbekistan’s foreign policy practice has, up to now, 
always been a stumbling block. 
Incentives for reform: financial incentives, 
arguments – but also coercion? 
China is promoting and, at the same time, demanding 
institutional change from its partners in the Silk Road 
Initiative. To this end, the Beijing government is co-
operating with expert organizations that provide 
internationally recognized models for border reforms. 
But what additional reform incentives has China 
offered Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan? 
First and foremost, these are financial incentives. 
China’s partners are rewarded for their participation 
in the Silk Road Initiative with considerable loans to 
construct and modernize their transport infrastruc-
ture. However, not all current projects such as roads, 
railways and ports are financed by China. The partner 
countries themselves and international development 
banks are also participating. The Belt and Road Initia-
tive is, therefore, very different from the usual devel-
opment policy programmes. Although China also 
appears to be a major investor in the partner coun-
tries of the initiative, the infrastructure projects are 
predominantly financed by loans (see also the chapter 
on border reforms in Central Asia, pp. 24). The Chinese 
loans are important because most of the countries 
have neither the equity nor access to credit for larger 
infrastructure projects. For this reason, projects such 
as the Silk Road Initiative are doubly interesting for 
the Central Asian countries. Firstly, they are small 
stimulus packages in times of economic crisis; secondly, 
the modernized transport routes benefit the coun-
tries’ domestic trade and export strategies. However, 
the loans are not tied to conditions such as reforms. 
They, therefore, only indirectly act as a mechanism 
for institutional transfer. Loans and possibly a partial 
waiver of future repayments might increase China’s 
prestige as a superpower and promote loyalty from 
the political elite and population towards China. This 
 
86 Ibid., 24. 
also applies to investments made by China as part of 
the Initiative. 
The situation with transit fees is different. Partner 
countries receive such fees when export goods are 
transported across their territory. Unlike loans and 
investments, however, the countries can only generate 
permanent transit fees if they have competitive transit 
corridors. This presupposes reform of border adminis-
tration. Ideally, even competition between the differ-
ent corridor routes could lead to the spread of best 
practices in modernizing the borders. However, the 
transit fees alone will not be so high to act as an in-
centive to undertake difficult and painful reforms just 
to obtain them. This applies all the more to Central 
Asia as it is already clear that, in the short and medium 
terms, Kazakhstan will receive the most transit fees 
from the Central Asian corridor. As an incentive, the 
chances of additional income being generated from 
the transit of goods are more significant. These mainly 
include operating dry ports and other loading centres, 
as well as developing economic hubs. These additional 
logistical services not only generate large revenues, 
they also create jobs. 
Furthermore, China is promoting other benefits 
resulting from participation in the Silk Road Initia-
tive. Beijing’s main argument is that trade between 
the partner countries can also flourish. In fact, trade 
facilitation can promote cross-border trade and, there-
fore, generate economic growth. However, the pre-
requisite for this is a competitive export industry. The 
example of the Eurasian Economic Union shows that 
merely reducing trade restrictions does not automati-
cally increase trade. Although it has dwindled mainly 
due to Russia’s economic crisis, it has also stagnated 
between other members of the EAEU, such as Kazakh-
stan and Belarus. 
There are currently potential mechanisms for an 
institutional transfer between China and Central Asia: 
financial incentives, rational arguments and attempts 
to generate loyalty. Conditions for lending and invest-
ment were not stipulated. With this approach, China 
remains faithful to its foreign policy line which is 
clearly different from that of Western development 
policy.87 
Since, to date, China has only tried to influence its 
partner countries with soft power, the question arises 
as to how far China might also try to coerce states into 
implementing reforms. Indirect compulsory measures 
against other states have long been part of China’s 
 
87 Cf. Godehardt, No End of History (see note 64). 
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repertoire when it comes to foreign policy. A recent 
example is the dispute over the new missile defence 
system in South Korea. Officially, it is directed at North 
Korea, but China has also openly rejected it. After 
South Korea put the system into operation, the num-
ber of Chinese tourists in South Korea fell sharply by 
40 percent. Since tourism is an important economic 
factor in South Korea, the country is clearly feeling 
the decline. Officially, China is not implementing any 
forced measures because of the rocket defence system, 
but the context is clearly highlighted in the South 
Korean discourse.88 However, it is not yet known if 
China has used such measures to force institutional 
change. The measures are, at any rate, likely to be 
counterproductive. The extent to which China is able 
to force reform depends on numerous contextual fac-
tors. This includes the extent to which the Central 
Asian countries themselves can harm China and the 
extent to which Russia could use the conflict to posi-
tion itself more strongly in the region. 
 
 
 
88 Alec Macfarlane, “China Is Crushing South Korea’s Tourism 
Industry”, CNN Money, 26 April 2017, http://money.cnn.com/ 
2017/04/26/news/chinese-tourism-south-korea/index. html 
(accessed 22 May 2017). 
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Border reforms in Central Asia: 
probably but no guarantee of success 
 
In the previous two chapters, it was argued that 
the Silk Road Economic Belt, combined with current 
domestic and foreign policy developments, has the 
potential to influence domestic policy in Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan. On the one hand, it could serve as 
an incentive where reforms have not yet been imple-
mented, such as border management and, on the 
other hand, as a catalyst where conversion processes 
are already being observed, for example in Uzbekis-
tan’s attitude to cooperation. Modern border manage-
ment not only requires domestic policy reforms at the 
border but also in all authorities involved in border 
management. There is also a need for intergovern-
mental cooperation between neighbouring countries, 
which, for example, would make duplicating checks 
superfluous. The routes for high-speed freight trans-
port to Europe by rail and road are components of the 
international transport corridors. The rail and road 
border crossings between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
are sometimes heavily frequented. The CAREC Corri-
dor 2 is important for importing and exporting to and 
from Central Asia. There is heavy rail traffic between Ka-
zakhstan and Uzbekistan on CAREC Corridors 3 and 6.89 
In both countries, the organization of border man-
agement is more of an obstacle to trade facilitation. 
Waiting times for clearance at the border are long and 
the border administration authorities often demand 
bribes. 
The Corridor Performance Measurement and Moni-
toring report by CAREC is the best survey of waiting 
time at the borders. Instead of using sampling or ex-
pert surveys, CAREC regularly monitors traffic flows 
in cooperation with logistics companies. These surveys 
found that delays in border clearance have actually 
increased. According to experts, these increasing wait-
ing times are now the main problem of transporting 
in Central Asia, even before transport costs are con-
sidered.90 
There are currently no data on border crossings 
between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. However, the 
average waiting time of 54 hours at the Kazakh-
 
89 ADB, CAREC Corridor Performance (see note 85), 49. 
90 Speech by Wolfgang Fengler (World Bank), USAID Trade 
Conference, Almaty, September 2016. 
Chinese border suggests that countries in the region 
generally have great difficulties in processing clear-
ance. One exception is the Trans-Eurasia-Express from 
Chongqing to Duisburg, to which simplified customs 
conditions apply. In contrast, waiting times at Kazakh-
Uzbek border crossings for lorries en route from Ka-
zakhstan to Uzbekistan have fallen slightly since 2010. 
In 2011, lorries had to wait an average of 10.3 and 11.0 
hours respectively at the Tazhen and Konysbayeva cross-
ings, while in 2015 it was less than eight hours. Uz-
bekistan was also able to reduce average waiting times 
at two Uzbek-Kazakh border crossings: from 12.8 to 8.9 
hours in Dautota and 9.5 to 6.4 hours in Yallama.91 
Table 4 
Border crossings between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
CAREC  
Corridor 
Kazakhstan Uzbekistan 
2a, 6a Beyneu (rail) 
Tazhen (road) 
Karakalpakstan/ 
Dautota (rail and road) 
3a, 6b, 6c Zhibek Zholy (rail) 
Yallama (rail) 
Saryagash (road) 
Konysbayeva (road) 
Keles (rail) 
Gisht Kuprik (road) 
 
Demanding bribes is a persistent problem. The data 
obtained from investigations do not initially give a 
particularly dramatic picture. According to a survey 
by CAREC, the probability of having to pay bribes at 
the border is 26 percent for customs inspections and 
20 percent for security controls.92 On CAREC Corridor 6, 
which runs through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, driv-
ers were asked to pay an average of $20. In another 
study, export firms put the payment of bribes in tenth 
place among all informal barriers to regional trade.93 
 
91 ADB, CAREC Corridor Performance (see note 85), 42. 
92 Ibid., 15ff. 
93 Roman Vakulchuk and Farrukh Irnazarov, Analysis of 
Informal Obstacles to Cross-border Economic Activity in Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan, ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Eco-
nomic Integration, no. 130 (Manila, May 2014), 10, http:// 
www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/42485/reiwp-130-
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There are, however, a number of reasons that this 
problem is, in fact, more serious and therefore com-
promises reforms and the functioning of the Silk Road 
Economic Belt more heavily than the surveys suggest.94 
Firstly, CAREC determines the amounts solely by 
asking the drivers. Freight companies importing and 
exporting on a larger scale are not included but their 
payments are likely to be much higher.95 Regional 
traders and exporters are also not likely to classify the 
problem as too serious because they know the system 
of informal payments well and they can be recovered 
through the selling price. The system requires a lot 
of detailed knowledge and offers regional traders and 
exporters a comparative advantage over external com-
petitors who would not be familiar with the intrica-
cies. The system also has a deterrent effect because 
foreign companies are wary of being prosecuted in 
Western countries.96 
According to the CAREC report, border management 
problems are ‘deeply rooted’.97 There are several struc-
tural reasons for this. One of them is the regime’s 
heightened need for security which is the result of its 
patrimonial-authoritarian rule. The regimes are par-
ticularly exposed to non-traditional security threats, 
such as terrorism and drug trafficking. The greatest 
danger, however, is from potential domestic oppo-
nents. This is why the regimes strive to effectively 
 
cross-border-economic-activity-kazakhstan-uzbekistan.pdf 
(accessed 9 December 2016). 
94 “Ėksperty: Na granicach Kazachstana carjat bezzakonie 
I korrupcija” [Experts: lawlessness and corruption rife at 
Kazakhstan’s borders], Nur.kz, 24 October 2016, http://www. 
nur.kz/1292921-eksperty-na-granicakh-kazakhstana-carya.html 
(accessed 10 December 2016); Nick Megoran, Gaël Raballand 
and Jerome Bouyjou, “Performance, Representation and the 
Economics of Border Control in Uzbekistan”, Geopolitics 10, 
no. 4 (2005): 712–40. 
95 According to information given by logistics firms, a lorry 
has to pay between $150 and $350 to pass over the border (In-
terview, Almaty, September 2016). This problem is recognized 
by international programmes, such as CAREC, but is very dif-
ficult to research. ADB, Central Asia Regional Economic Coopera-
tion Corridor Performance Measurement and Monitoring: A Forward-
Looking Retrospective (Manila, 2014), http://www.adb.org/sites/ 
default/files/publication/148731/carec-cpmm-forward-looking-
retrospective.pdf (accessed 8 December 2016). 
96 VimpelCom had to pay a fine of $835 million to the US 
and Dutch authorities for corruption in Kazakhstan to avoid 
having to pay further fines. “VimpelCom Pays $835m to US 
and Dutch over Uzbekistan Telecoms Bribes”, The Guardian, 
16 February 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/ 
feb/19/vimpelcom-pays-835m-to-us-and-dutch-over-uzbekistan-
telecoms-bribes (accessed 24 October 2016). 
97 CAREC, Corridor Performance (see note 85), 15. 
control society, which includes restrictive surveillance 
of its borders, and this is why secret services or quasi-
military authorities are responsible for it. In Kazakh-
stan, this is the National Security Committee of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan (NSC) which also organizes the 
activities of all other authorities involved in border 
management, such as the customs authorities, veteri-
nary and food inspectors. The Uzbek counterpart to 
the NSC is the Committee for State Border Protection 
which is under the control of the influential National 
Security Service. It coordinates the work of other rele-
vant authorities, in particular the customs author-
ities.98 
An additional structural factor is corruption and 
competition between the authorities. These have a 
strong interest in maintaining the status quo because 
of the high income from bribes. This includes, for 
example, maintaining what are known as adminis-
trative barriers which provide an incentive for corrup-
tion.99 The situation in Uzbekistan is particularly 
problematic. There are no administrative regulations 
which would allow for a transparent and uniform 
interpretation of customs legislation. As a result, the 
individual border authorities issue their own rules. 
To reduce administrative barriers, it might be useful 
to introduce a risk management system. This would 
mean that not all imported goods would need to be 
checked, only those classified as hazardous. However, 
competition between the national authorities is likely 
to make it difficult to harmonize and expedite pro-
cedures with better coordination.100 
Overall, the initial conditions for reforms in both 
countries are quite different. Improving border man-
agement would be a considerable challenge for both. 
To achieve inter-governmental cooperation at the 
borders, Uzbekistan would have to meet many more 
requirements than Kazakhstan. Although Kazakhstan 
has not so far been keen on such cooperation, it 
has developed a basic culture of cooperation that pro- 
 
98 UN ESCAP, Improving Border Management to Facilitate Trade 
in SPECA: Challenges and Prospects (Bangkok, 2010). 
99 Administrative barriers have the effect of making state 
administration services very difficult to receive or only by 
bypassing official procedures or with considerable waiting 
times. Paying bribes allows firms to overcome these hurdles. 
See also Z. Turisbekov and Zh. Dzhandosova, Administrativnye 
bar’ery kak istochnik korrupcionnych pravonarushenij v sfere gossluzhby 
[Administrative barriers as source of corruption for civil ser-
vice] (Almaty, 2007). 
100 ADB, Uzbekistan: Trade Facilitation and Logistics Development 
Strategy Report (Manila, 2009), 20. 
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motes mutual trust and has proven to be reliable. 
Uzbekistan is yet to achieve this. 
Interests and incentives 
How have Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan reacted to the 
Silk Road Initiative? What interests in participation and 
incentives for reform can be identified? There are clear 
differences on all scores between the two countries. 
The Silk Road Initiative is in line with the strategies 
of both countries to develop their export economy. 
Modernized transport routes also reduce transport 
costs for Central Asian countries. This not only facili-
tates important imports from China but also improves 
access to old and new export markets. Above all, access 
to Iran and Turkey, but also to southern Asian coun-
tries, is of interest to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 
Kazakhstan has so far primarily exported natural 
resources. Due to low oil prices, however, the govern-
ment has restarted attempts to strengthen its manu-
facturing and exporting industry. Uzbekistan has been 
able to maintain and expand its manufacturing in-
dustry. Its export products include cars, textiles and 
agricultural products. 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan currently benefit a 
great deal from Chinese loans which make the imple-
mentation of large infrastructure projects possible. 
These include new construction projects and moder-
nizing the roads and railways. Given shrinking public 
budgets and a fundamental shortage of investors, 
these projects are welcome as they have the effect of 
small economic stimulus packages in view of empty 
coffers. High-quality roads and railways also benefit 
the local economy. In this way, they can help give the 
regimes more legitimacy. 
The largest ever infrastructure project financed by 
China in Central Asia was completed in Uzbekistan in 
2016. The 19-kilometre-long Kamchiq tunnel was built 
along the Angren-Pop railway line, which is to be part 
of the planned SREB link between China and Kyrgyzs-
tan, at a cost of $455 million.101 Uzbekistan’s President 
Shavkat Mirziyoyev wooed Chinese high-tech investors 
on a five-day trip to China in May 2017.102 
 
101 “Uzbekistan & China: Friends in a Time of Need”, Eurasia-
net, 23 June 2016, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/79381 
(accessed 18 October 2016). 
102 “Uzbekistan: President in Pursuit of Big Deals in China 
during 5-Day Visit”, Eurasianet, 11 May 2017, http://www. 
eurasianet.org/node/83541 (accessed 22 May 2017). 
China also finances major infrastructure projects 
in Kazakhstan. The most prominent and visible of 
these is the International Transit Corridor Western 
Europe–Western China, which is the current CAREC 
Corridor 1b. This is explicitly about the expansion of 
transit capacities through Kazakhstan as part of the 
Silk Road Economic Belt.103 Transport routes between 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are also being modern-
ized. On the Kazakh side, the focus is mainly on road 
connections to Uzbekistan.104 
The fact that both countries have launched their 
own programmes and financed projects themselves 
shows they are very interested in modernizing their 
transport routes.105 There are currently 15 major proj-
ects in Uzbekistan involving several investors. Seven 
of these projects are fully funded from their own re-
sources. Kazakhstan, on the other hand, has officially 
launched its infrastructure development programme 
(Nurly Zhol) in line with the Chinese Belt and Road 
Initiative and has even implemented and funded 16 
infrastructure projects itself. These include a Kazakh 
terminal in the port of the eastern Chinese city of 
Lianyungang. 
However, both countries are deriving very different 
benefits from the Initiative in the short and medium 
terms. Kazakhstan is China’s preferred partner in Cen-
tral Asia and enjoys numerous benefits from high-
speed freight transit and beyond. It has, therefore, 
benefited directly from the transit fees. Not only do 
most of the corridors lead through the country, but 
so does the only high-speed connection from China 
to Europe already in operation. As early as 2007, these 
fees accounted for 17 percent of total revenue of the 
state-owned Temir Zholy Group.106 Kazakhstan not 
only generates income from the transit fees but also 
from loading containers at dry ports and operating 
the state-owned logistics company KazTrans. Experts 
hope that many tens of thousands of jobs would be 
created from this positive development in container 
 
103 However, Kazakhstan has been pursuing this project 
since 2007, cf. Kulipanova, International Transport in Central 
Asia (see note 30), 20. 
104 This is financed by a consortium of international devel-
opment banks, ADB, EBRD, the World Bank and others. 
105 The following data comes from the Reconnecting Asia 
database at the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS), https://reconnectingasia.csis.org (accessed 12 January 
2017). 
106 Kulipanova, International Transport in Central Asia (see note 30), 
10. 
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transport.107 Freight transport between China and 
Europe via Kazakhstan doubled between 2012 and 
2014 and recently totalled 91,500 tonnes.108 In the 
first nine months of 2016, 565 trains each with 50 to 
80 wagons travelled the China–Europe route. By 2020, 
the government is forecasting that 800,000 containers 
will be transported along the China–Europe route, 
up to 300,000 containers on the Silkwind route via 
the Caspian Sea and up to 400,000 containers on the 
routes toward Iran.109 
Kazakhstan can also expect substantial investment 
from China. As mentioned, the most recent investment 
partnership was sealed in September 2016. Beijing and 
Astana decided to transfer 51 factories from China to 
Kazakhstan. The investment volume is $26 billion.110 
In addition to logistics and industry, investments are 
being made in the agricultural sector as well as re-
search and technology. A Kazakh expert on China esti-
mates there are currently agreements on Chinese in-
vestments worth $70.6 billion.111 Although it is unlikely 
that these arrangements will be fully implemented, 
but even if only part of it is realized, this does not 
diminish China’s prominent role in meeting Kazakh-
stan’s search for international investors. 
It does not follow that reforms will inevitably be ini-
tiated from the shared interests and incentives. The 
Silk Road Initiative contains mainly soft mechanisms 
of institution transfer. Officially, there are no 
conditions or compulsory measures. Nor would they 
make reforms more probable. Since Kazakhstan would 
benefit more from the Silk Road Initiative than Uz-
bekistan, the incentives for reform are more clearly 
identifiable here. However, it is clear that the already 
considerable importance of China in Central Asia will 
 
107 Evgeny Vinokurov, Transport Corridors of the Silk Road Eco-
nomic Belt across the Eurasian Economic Union: Preliminary Estimates 
for Transportation Capacity and Investment Needs, Working Paper 
(28 April 2016). 
108 Ardak Bukeeva, “Kak Kazachstan razvivaet tranzit iz 
Kitaja i chto emu meshaet” [How Kazakhstan is developing 
a transit from China and what is getting the way], Forbes 
Kazakhstan, 4 January 2017, http://forbes.kz/finances/markets/ 
popast_vkoleyu_1/ (accessed 6 January 2017). 
109 Ardak Bukeeva, “Kak Kazachstan budet zarabatyvat’ na 
Novom Shëlkovom puti” [What sources of income will Kazakh-
stan have on the New Silk Road], Forbes Kazakhstan, 8 Novem-
ber 2016, http://forbes.kz//finances/markets/kak_kazahstan_ 
budet_zarabatyivat_na_novom_shelkovom_puti/?utm_source=
forbes&utm_medium=incut&utm_cam paign=126291 (ac-
cessed 6 January 2017). 
110 “Kazachstan i Kitaj sozdadut 51 sovmestnoe predprijatie” 
(see note 54). 
111 Syroezhkin, “Kazachstan i Kitaj” (see note 57). 
continue to grow due to the Silk Road Initiative. The 
infrastructure projects funded by China are clearly 
related to the further development of transport corri-
dors so it is now hard to believe that the Central Asian 
states would completely shut themselves off to reforms 
and would, therefore, withdraw cooperation from the 
Belt and Road Initiative. Rather, the question is what 
kinds of reforms will they implement and how? 
Observable change 
What changes can be observed in patterns of inter-
governmental cooperation and in border manage-
ment? Uzbekistan’s new President Mirziyoyev has 
promised both far-reaching domestic reforms and a 
‘regional re-launch’. The proposed domestic policy 
measures include fundamental steps, such as floating 
the exchange rate and currency convertibility, remov-
ing travel restrictions on Uzbek citizens and perma-
nently allowing foreigners from certain countries to 
enter without a visa. 
These reforms will probably be difficult and pro-
tracted. However, Mirziyoyev also launched numerous 
innovations in the first six months of his term and 
public discourse has already changed as a result. Mirzi-
yoyev himself has criticized the state for functioning 
poorly and he also allows negative headlines, includ-
ing a survey which found that a large proportion of 
respondents are highly dissatisfied that basic needs 
are not being met.112 Another example is his handling 
of Uzbek migrant workers in Russia. Although they 
were urgently needed in their country of origin, Kari-
mov left the migrants to their own devices and the 
problem was silenced. However, in July 2017 the 
Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations recog-
nized how important the migrant workers were for 
the country and began formalizing and regulating 
migrant workers travelling to Russia.113 
Mirziyoyev also wants to improve Uzbekistan’s once 
hostile relations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and 
further develop relations with these countries. On 22 
December 2016, just a week after Mirziyoyev started 
his term, the Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan signed a 
 
112 “Uzbekistan: Unusually Frank Poll Highlights Unhappi-
ness”, Eurasianet, 13 July 2017, http://www.eurasianet.org/ 
node/84351 (accessed 27 July 2017). 
113 “Nachata organizovannaja otpravka trudovych migran-
tov v Rossiyu” [The organised deployment of migrant workers 
to Russia has begun], Gazeta.uz, 27 July 2017, http://www. 
gazeta.uz/ru/2017/07/27/work/ (accessed 27 July 2017). 
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trade policy agreement and are currently preparing 
a roadmap for further cooperation.114 It was also 
decided to accelerate border processing.115 
Political innovations by presidents that have re-
cently come to power must certainly be considered 
critically. Far-reaching promises can also serve pri-
marily as a means of gaining support and legitimacy, 
but then later simply prove to be unachievable. It is, 
therefore, worth looking back a few years. Although in 
the last few years of Islom Karimov’s rule, Uzbekistan 
did not turn away from its protectionist foreign and 
economic policy, there was a slight, moderate shift in 
his attitude to cooperation. Should Mirziyoyev stick 
to his plan to push through change, he can start here. 
Changes to relations between Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan, which began in 2010, can be traced back 
to a cautious policy of openness by Tashkent and an 
increase in interactions. That Presidents Karimov and 
Nazarbayev met more frequently from 2010 played 
an important role, whereas previously this had only 
occurred sporadically in the first two decades after 
independence. This rapprochement at the highest 
level resulted in symbolic accentuation, but also in 
some initiatives at the working level. 
This period of rapprochement between the two 
presidents resulted in a strategic partnership in 2013 
which was praised in both countries as an expression 
of a ‘new level of cooperation’. Local experts also con-
sidered the new strategy a ‘significant development’.116 
Karimov mainly emphasized the economic dimension 
of the partnership, while Nazarbayev highlighted 
the potential benefits of improved cooperation for the 
whole region.117 In the same year, Kazakhstan opened 
a new embassy building in Tashkent. It had a represen-
 
114 “Kazachstan i Uzbekistan razrabatyvajut Dorozhnuju 
kartu sotrudnichestva na desjatiletnjuju perspektivu” [Ka-
zakhstan and Uzbekistan devise a roadmap for cooperation 
over the next ten years], Novosti Uzbekistana, 3 January 
2017, http://nuz.uz/politika/19246-kazahstan-i-uzbekistan-
razrabatyvayut-dorozhnuyu-kartu-sotrudnichestva-na-
desyatiletnyuyu-perspektivu.html (accessed 7 January 2017). 
115 “Uzbekistan i Kazachstan rabotajut nad uproshcheniem 
peresechenija granicy” [Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan work to 
simplify border crossing], Gazeta.uz, 26 December 2016, http:// 
www.gazeta.uz/ru/2016/12/26/kz (accessed 7 January 2017). 
116 Ibid. 
117 “Uzbekistan i Kazachstan podpisali Dogovor o strategi-
cheskom partnerstve” [Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan sign agree-
ment on strategic partnership], Gazeta.uz, 14 June 2013, http:// 
www.gazeta.uz/2013/06/14/visit/ (accessed 11 August 2016). 
tative character and was built in oriental style, remi-
niscent of Uzbekistan.118 
The Joint Intergovernmental Commission is the 
most important instrument for cooperation between 
the two countries. Although it has existed since the 
1990s, observers ascribed an increasingly important 
role to Commission meetings. However, the content 
and results of these discussions were generally in-
transparent. According to one trade expert, they are 
often a matter of very specific questions on trade. For 
example, at the 15th Commission meeting in March 
2015, it was decided that Uzbekistan would cut import 
duties on confectionery and meat products from 2020 
onwards.119 According to official information, in addi-
tion to trading issues, matters concerning road, rail 
and air transport infrastructure are also on the 
agenda.120 Alongside the Intergovernmental Commis-
sion, other interstate commissions, such as border de-
marcation, have also started or intensified their work. 
These shifts in policy took place against a back-
ground of changing economic relations. The volume 
of trade between the two countries rose fourfold be-
tween 2005 and 2013. As a result, Kazakhstan became 
Uzbekistan’s third most important trading partner 
with 12 percent of its total volume of foreign trade. 
Investments also increased slightly. In 2016, there 
were over 600 companies registered in Kazakhstan 
with Uzbek participation; 431 of these companies 
were established between 2010 and 2016. In 2015, 
companies from the two countries signed contracts 
 
118 “Pamjatnik Abaju i novoe posol’stvo Kazachstana otkryty 
v Tashkente” [A memorial for Abaj and a new embassy build-
ing unveiled in Tashkent], Tengrinews, 14 June 2013, https:// 
tengrinews.kz/sng/pamyatnik-abayu-novoe-posolstvo-
kazahstana-otkryityi-236195/. In contrast, the area reserved 
for Uzbekistan in Astana, the capital since 1997, is still un-
developed. Uzbekistan is, therefore, the only country whose 
embassy is located in the former capital, Almaty. 
119 “Uzbekistan snizit akcizy na kazachstanskie konditerskie 
izdelija i mjaso k 2020 godu” [Uzbekistan to reduce duties on 
Kazakh confectionary and meat by 2020], Kazinform, 11 March 
2016, http://www.kazinform.kz/ru/uzbekistan-snizit-akcizy-na-
kazahstanskie-konditerskie-izdeliya-i-myaso-k-2020-godu_ 
a2879913 (accessed 10 December 2016). 
120 “Kazachstan i Uzbekistan obsuzhdajut rasshrenie nomen-
klatury vzaimno postavljaemych tovarov” [Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan discuss expanding the list of traded goods], Ka-
zakhstan Today, 11 March 2016, http://www.kt.kz/rus/politics/ 
kazahstan_i_uzbekistan_obsuzhdajut_rasshirenie_nomen 
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(accessed 10 December 2016). 
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worth $27 million.121 However, the majority of these 
companies are micro-entities; only eight have more 
than 150 employees. The three largest companies are 
involved in railway logistics, construction and metal 
processing.122 In 2016, only 206 companies in Uzbeki-
stan were operated with Kazakh capital.123 But in-
vesting in Uzbekistan remains a high-risk business, as 
one Kazakh investor put it.124 Furthermore, the num-
ber of Uzbek migrant workers in Kazakhstan almost 
doubled from 404,468 to 797,982 between 2011 and 
2015.125 
It is worth noting that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
have jointly announced plans to reform their borders 
and cooperate more on border management.126 In 
particular, Kazakhstan has promised far-reaching 
reforms of state institutions. In May 2015, President 
Nazarbayev presented his ‘100 concrete steps to im-
plementing five institutional reforms’ programme 
aimed at remedying serious state shortcomings. The 
main thrust of the programme is already clear in the 
first two of the five points. They are about ‘developing 
a professional state apparatus’ and ‘strengthening 
the rule of law’. This includes customs reforms and, 
among other things, the introduction of a ‘single-
window’ system. This is intended to enable importing 
and exporting companies to manage all administrative 
matters in one place, so they do not have to commu-
nicate with several authorities. However, Kazakhstan 
has been trying to reform its state apparatus since 1997, 
with varying results. The country was particularly un-
successful in combating its systemic corruption. 
The timing of the new programme is particularly 
striking. It can be interpreted as a signal to China 
which announced its first Belt and Road strategy two 
 
121 “Uzbekistan i Kazachstan podpisali kontrakty na $27 mln” 
[Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have signed contracts worth $27 
million], UzDaily, 25 September 2015, http://www.uzdaily.uz/ 
articles-id-26330.htm (accessed 9 August 2016). 
122 Excerpt from the Statistical Office of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, Database on Investment, http://www.stat.gov.kz/ 
(accessed 9 August 2016). 
123 “Kurs na aktivizaciju torgovo-ėkonomicheskogo sotrud-
nichestva” [En route to activating commercial economic 
cooperation], UzDaily, 18 April 2016, http://www.uzdaily.uz/ 
articles-id-28362.htm (accessed 9 August 2016). 
124 Askar Muminov, “Kto ne riskuet, tot ne idet v Uzbeki-
stan” [No risk, no Uzbekistan], Kursiv, 20 June 2013, http:// 
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ne-idet-v-Uzbekistan/ (accessed 12 December 2016). 
125 Statistical Office of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Database 
(see note 122). 
126 “Uzbekistan i Kazachstan podpisali Dogovor o strategi-
cheskom partnerstve” (see note 117). 
months earlier in March 2015. The fact that state 
reforms are highlighted in the programme is also 
likely to be symbolic.127 
Uzbekistan also submitted an action plan in the 
spring of 2017. It has five priorities that are very simi-
lar to the five institutional reforms in Kazakhstan’s 
100 Steps strategy. The first two priorities concern the 
development of the state, the rule of law and the judi-
ciary, followed by economic liberalization, social pro-
tection and security.128 
Nevertheless, the border reforms are still limited 
to announcements. This shows how difficult reform 
can be. International indices which measure logistics 
performance do not suggest any improvement so far. 
Kazakhstan has since moved up the Logistics Perfor-
mance Index, however, this is not due to changes in 
border management but other factors. Kazakh media 
and local experts are still painting a gloomy picture 
of reality at the country’s borders. At the end of 2016, 
it was described as ‘corrupt and lawless’ in an online 
portal close to the government.129 
It is true that the main causes of this change can 
be found in both domestic and regional dynamics (see 
chapter Context, pp. 11). Nevertheless, it seems to be 
taking a direction that also benefits the Silk Road Ini-
tiative, that is towards more cooperation and border 
reforms. The experience of good cooperation in other 
areas is the prerequisite for trusting cooperation in 
the sensitive area of border management. However, 
recent developments also point to links between re-
forms or reform announcements and the New Silk 
Road. One indication of this is that Uzbekistan tried 
several times under President Karimov to improve 
its difficult relations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
This dynamic appears to have been accelerated under 
Mirziyoyev. In particular, relations with Kyrgyzstan 
are important for constructing the rail link with 
China. There are also explicit references to China’s 
Initiative in border management reforms. On the one 
hand, Kazakhstan has created an island solution in 
 
127 Nursultan Nasarbajew, “Plan nacii – 100 shagov po reali-
zacii pjati institucional’nych reform”, Kazinform, 20 May 2015, 
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zhenie No. 1)” [Trading strategy for five priority developments 
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strategy.gov.uz/ru/lists/docview/15 (accessed 15 July 2017). 
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the border town of Khorgos and, therefore, already 
facilitates high-speed freight transit from China to 
Europe. However, the model cannot be transferred 
arbitrarily. On the other hand, Kazakhstan President 
Nazarbayev has also announced ‘deep’ reforms at 
borders in his 100 Step strategy. 
Flexible boundaries of change 
The biggest challenge for Uzbekistan is to change 
its foreign policy and develop a reliable culture of 
cooperation. For Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, it is a 
matter of initiating administrative reforms in the 
sensitive fields of security (border security) and finance 
(customs). Since the reforms will be costly and time 
consuming, the countries will have to weigh up how 
quickly the reforms can be implemented and how 
specific or comprehensive they want them to be. Firstly, 
this will depend on how keen the countries’ centres 
of power are on the reforms. Secondly, reforms are 
always subject to a modernization dilemma and be-
cause they can jeopardize regime stability and face 
resistance. 
The interests of both countries are crucial in deter-
mining the extent to which the respective central 
government pushes ahead with change. Clear differ-
ences become apparent here. While Kazakhstan’s pros-
pects for short-term and long-term economic benefits 
from high-speed freight transport are good, Uzbeki-
stan’s opportunities are somewhat more distant. The 
country must take a much longer path to reform. The 
Kyrgyz part of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan rail-
way line is also missing, meaning that the only freight 
transport route from China is via Kazakhstan. Both 
countries depend on good relations with China be-
cause their larger neighbour plays a vital economic 
role in Central Asia which no other superpower from 
outside could take on. This also influences the inter-
ests of the Central Asian states. 
However, just because the central governments 
have a strong interest in reform, this alone does not 
mean they will succeed. This is due to the moderniza-
tion dilemma mentioned above. The countries want to 
secure the system of authoritarian rule which means 
retaining the monopoly of power at the top. The sta-
bility of this system rests, on the one hand, on patri-
monial control over substate actors and, on the other 
hand, on their own patrimonial rights, in particular, 
the right to informal appropriation. Modifying this 
system through reforms is doubly dangerous. If the 
centre introduces rational legal procedures, they are 
likely to revert back to the centre or be abused. If it 
removes the patrimonial rights of substate actors – 
in the case of border reforms, this would be mainly 
combating widespread corruption in state agencies – 
it will face resistance. The decisive factor here is that 
the central government is dependent on the coopera-
tion of groups of actors from whom it wishes to with-
draw rights. In the longer term, there are only three 
conceivable ways out of this dilemma which are not 
mutually exclusive. 
 In the course of a power struggle, the pioneers of 
conservative modernization succeed against the 
resistance. 
 There is consensus among a broad majority of 
the political elite that reforms are necessary. One 
reason for this agreement might be, for example, 
an internal or external constraint that would 
legitimize a reform. 
 The gradual replacement of the old, Soviet-influ-
enced elite could lead to a cultural change that 
gives new ideas a boost. 
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Outlook and recommendations 
 
The Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) on its own will not 
be an engine for economic development in Central Asia. 
The economic well-being of the region will depend, 
above all, on the extent to which the countries are suc-
cessful in reforming their existing growth models. 
Several aspects provide grounds for assuming the 
SREB is more than just another investment project. 
There is a real chance that the initiative will have a 
positive impact on cooperation patterns and reforms 
on the borders of Central Asia. With the SREB, China 
is not only expressing its interest in better cooperation 
and modernized border management in Central Asia 
but is also creating an incentive structure for reforms 
in the Central Asian states. 
Whether and to what extent change takes place in 
both areas is determined by the interests and abilities 
of the respective state to implement reforms. These 
factors have varying degrees of impact in Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan. It is already clear, however, that states 
can no longer completely avoid the project. Both have 
committed themselves to the SREB and have received 
favourable loans. They cannot afford a fundamental 
deterioration of relations with China. For China, on 
the other hand, it is important for geostrategic reasons 
and for its international reputation that the high-
speed freight transit via the Eurasian land bridge is 
realized. 
Against this background, three short and medium-
term scenarios can be outlined for the Silk Road Eco-
nomic Belt. 
(1) States embrace comprehensive reforms, border 
management is modernized, Uzbekistan develops a 
trusting culture of cooperation. All this would reduce 
transport costs and duration of freight transit to West-
ern Europe. In addition, the reforms would improve 
living and working conditions in the local economy 
and benefit small businesses and the countries’ 
residents. 
(2) Reforms and the necessary cooperation did not occur. 
This would cause the high-speed freight transit to fail 
in the long term because it would no longer be finan-
cially viable. However, it seems unlikely that Kazakh-
stan and Uzbekistan would not make any attempt to 
implement reforms. Nevertheless, these could prove 
difficult in both countries, especially in Uzbekistan. 
(3) China pursues its own interests as a matter of priority. 
In this scenario, reforms do take place but only apply 
to the high-speed freight transit as part of the SREB. 
All other ‘border crossers’ do not benefit from im-
proved border processing, must expect long waiting 
times and are still forced to make informal payments. 
This is the principle behind the Trans-Eurasia Logistics 
high-speed route which is already in operation. This 
model, based on formal and informal arrangements, 
gives SREB trains special status and would allow the 
Chinese Initiative to be implemented swiftly. The trains 
on this route are processed in record time, with no 
appreciable improvement in Kazakh border manage-
ment. 
The third scenario is most probable in the short 
and medium terms but is problematic for at least two 
reasons. Firstly, it increases the inequality between 
the large export companies and small, local businesses 
and also among citizens. Secondly, this model signifi-
cantly reduces the incentive for further comprehensive 
reforms. 
Implications for German and 
European policies 
For years, Germany and the EU have strived to pro-
mote intergovernmental cooperation, the rule of 
law and reform of border administration, including 
coordinated border management (CBM), in Central 
Asia. However, Europe had too little influence and 
could not generate much reform pressure on the 
countries. Now, China has emerged as a new actor in 
Central Asia with similar goals but more influence. 
It has built greater reform pressure and has provided 
reform incentives through the SREB. 
The EU could try to intensify dialogue with the Cen-
tral Asian states, China and the expert organizations in-
volved on how objectives could be pursued together. 
This would enable the EU to strengthen its foreign poli-
cy objectives in the region and make available its exper-
tise from past experience, for example from the BOMCA 
programme. At the same time, it could agree close co-
operation with China and the Central Asian states. If 
cooperation and the rule of law can be expanded at 
Outlook and recommendations 
SWP Berlin 
Movement on the Silk Road 
November 2017 
 
 
 
32 
the borders in this manner, this would be an impor-
tant milestone for further reforms in Central Asia. 
It would also be conceivable that the EU seeks to 
position itself as a corrective to any Beijing policies 
which are too short-sighted and self-serving. Sustain-
able border reforms benefitting all ‘border users’ are 
in the interests of both the EU and a stable Central 
Asia. China and the Central Asian states, on the other 
hand, may be inclined to shy away from difficult 
reforms and instead insist on special rules for SREB 
trains. 
In May 2017, at the Silk Road Forum in Beijing, 
China rejected some concrete EU proposals for the 
final communiqué. This gave Europeans the impression 
that a serious cooperation is generally not desired.130 
However, comprehensive border reforms, which apply 
to all, would very certainly be in China’s interest. In 
particular, this means the model of unilateral prefer-
ence for SREB trains would not prevail. International 
transport corridors only work if they really are multi-
modal, i.e. facilitate the smooth transit of lorries. In 
addition, China is striving to improve its image among 
the population of Central Asia. Dubious practices in 
border processing which benefit solely China would, 
therefore, be counterproductive. 
Specifically, Germany and the EU should address 
the issue on two levels. Firstly, it would make sense 
to this more of an issue at the political level. So far, 
dialogue on border reforms has been limited to the 
expert level and, what is known as, technical co-
operation. Expert knowledge and competence are 
important, but it must not be overlooked that these 
are delicate reforms and they not only have their 
advocates but also numerous opponents. Receiving 
joint political attention from the EU and China can 
both strengthen the central government’s interest in 
reforms and weaken the position of anti-reformists. 
The EU-China Connectivity Platform might be an 
ideal arena to generate publicity. It was launched in 
spring 2016 through a memorandum of understand-
ing between the European Commission and China. 
The overall objective is to create synergies between 
EU and Chinese connectivity initiatives. Point 3 of the 
memorandum also advocates jointly promoting un-
impeded traffic flows and facilitating trade in order to 
 
130 Stephan Scheuer, “Seidenstraßen-Forum: Mitsprache 
unerwünscht”, Handelsblatt, 15 May 2017; Angela Stanzel, 
“China’s Belt and Road – New Name, Same Doubts?”, Euro-
pean Council on Foreign Relations, 19 May 2017, http://www. 
ecfr.eu/article/commentary_chinas_belt_and_road_new_ 
name_same _doubts (accessed 20 May 2017). 
reduce trade costs along the corridors between China 
and Europe. If Brussels, Beijing and the governments 
of the Central Asian states work together on the issue 
of border reforms, they would also continue to further 
develop the founding manifesto of the platform. Fur-
thermore, a Chinese-European partnership would 
enhance the platform: Beyond the issues of hard infra-
structure which dominate the agenda of the platform, 
concerns about ‘soft connectivity’ could also be aired. 
However, Germany and like-minded Member States 
would first have to convince the remaining EU coun-
tries to add the issue to their agendas. One major argu-
ment for this step is that the chances of implementing 
border management reforms have never been as high 
as they are today. Efficient border management in 
Central Asia would potentially contribute to growth 
and stability in Central Asia and thus also serve Euro-
pean interests. It would also be advisable for the EU 
itself to commit to this issue because European trans-
port companies are among the main beneficiaries of 
the SREB initiative. Up to now, transport companies 
have unintentionally abetted SREB trains being priori-
tized at border crossings. 
Moreover, Germany could commit EU foreign 
policy to greater cooperation and reforms in border 
management between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 
through technical cooperation but also through dia-
logue at a higher political level. However, the govern-
ments of the relevant Central Asian states would have 
to show strong interest in this form of cooperation. 
In principle, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are indeed 
interested in the – also visible – presence of the EU 
and, in particular, Germany. For this reason, direct 
national contact with the EU would be an advantage. 
This would lend itself to cooperation on reforms at 
border crossings between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
for several reasons. Until the route between China, 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan is complete, the route via 
Kazakhstan will remain an important link to the south. 
If Europe and Germany were to commit to coordinated 
border management, they could help transform Uz-
bekistan’s promises of reform into a concrete project 
that benefits all stakeholders. The main focus here 
would be to draw political attention and initiate 
political dialogue between the partners. In addition, 
Germany and the EU could draw on their own experi-
ence, for example from BOMCA and the Rule of Law 
Initiative. This includes technical competencies as 
well as sensitivity to the local context and the diffi-
culties of implementing reforms. 
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Abbreviations 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
BOMCA Border Management Programme in Central Asia 
CADAP Central Asia Drug Action Programme 
CAREC Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation 
Program 
CBM Coordinated Border Management 
CIM/SMGS Common consignment note for eastern and western 
rail freight shipments 
CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation 
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization 
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
GDP Gross domestic product 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
ITC Inland Transport Committee (UNECE) 
NDRC National Development and Reform Commission 
NSC National Security Committee of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan 
OBOR One Belt, One Road (former official name of the Belt 
and Road Initiative/New Silk Road Initiative) 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
SCO Shanghai Organization for Cooperation 
SREB Silk Road Economic Belt (name of the Eurasian 
section of the Belt and Road Initiative) 
TFA Trade Facilitation Agreement (WTO) 
TIR Transports Internationaux Routiers (international 
road transport convention) 
TRACECA Transport Corridor Europe–Caucasus–Asia 
UN United Nations 
UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
UN ESCAP United Nations Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific 
WTO World Trade Organization 
